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Dispute resolution plays an important role in industrial relations. This is because conflicts are an 
inherent part in any relationship and industrial relationships are not exempt from this. To this end 
it is important to have a dispute resolution system that ensures efficient and effective resolution of 
disputes that arise in the course of industrial relationships. Efficient and effective dispute 
resolution is particularly important in the industrial relations arena as industrial relations attract 
various stakeholders, some who may not necessarily be a part of the dispute that arises, but who 
might inadvertently be affected in the situation of an unresolved dispute. 
Traditionally litigation has been the most commonly utilized medium of resolution of industrial 
disputes, with disputants rather choosing to take the dispute to the courts of law for adjudication 
and determination. However with the advent of alternative means of dispute resolution such as 
negotiation, mediation and arbitration, it has become paramount that these alternative dispute 
resolution methods be promoted for the reasons of expediency and efficiency.  
Regardless of the advent of such methods of dispute resolution, courts have still exercised some 
form of control and oversight of the dispute processes, and such oversight can be easily misused 
to defeat the main intention of having the alternative dispute resolution processes in the first place. 
This thesis discusses reforming the approach to alternative dispute resolution in Kenyan industrial 
disputes, so as to achieve maximum efficiency of the system. In doing this, the thesis does a 
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE KENYAN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
FRAMEWORK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An efficient and functional industrial dispute resolution system and framework is without doubt 
pivotal to the growth of industry. This is because industry generally relies on human resources 
for operational purposes, and consequently, disputes are more often than not inevitable and 
unavoidable. This is more so because of the shift from manufacturing to service based industries 
as noted by Jan Theron.1 This has led to the emergence of reliance on human capital to drive the 
service-based industry, and has thus necessitated a reform of labour law and policies.  
As the shift to a reliance on human  resources in service-based industries continues, the 
nature and rate of occurrence of industrial disputes has also increased to  such an extent that 
courts have become so overwhelmed, thereby  leading  to the slow resolution of such industrial 
disputes. There has thus been an increasing reliance on alternative dispute resolution methods for 
settling of such disputes.  When writing about arbitration in Kenya, Gakeri2 notes that, until 
recently, courts have been guided by the traditional notion that they have exclusive jurisdiction 
in dispute resolution. He states that because arbitration is a private and consensual procedure, it 
has been perceived as competing with the courts in the administration of justice and subject to 
judicial control. He notes, however, that with time the courts have had to cope grudgingly with 
an ever-increasing workload and are thus slowly embracing arbitration, even though this is not 
out of any conviction that it is a positive alternative.3 This  general reluctance  on the part of the 
courts to apply alternative dispute resolution mechanisms also extends to labour and industrial 
disputes which, regardless of the provisions for alternative dispute resolution methods such as 
conciliation and arbitration, frequently make their way to court, thus beating the expediency and 
efficiency advantage of out-of-court processes. 
                                                          
1 Jan Theron  The Shift to Services and Triangular Employment’ Working Paper Development Policy Research Unit 
University of Cape Town (2007). 
2 John Gakeri. ‘Placing Kenya on the Global Platform: An evaluation of the legal framework on arbitration and 
ADR’ (2011) 1  International Journal of Humanities and Social Science at 220 




(a) The Role of the Kenyan Constitution in Industrial Dispute Resolution  
The Constitution of Kenya, under art 41(1) of the Bill of Rights, provides for the right to fair 
labour practices.4 The interpretation, application and enforcement of this right to fair labour 
practices are often the cause of many industrial disputes in Kenya. This is because workers seek 
to claim protection from unjust and unfair labour practices by way of litigation more so in the 
High Court that has primary jurisdiction in constitutional interpretation.5 
While declaring that it is the responsibility of the state to ensure access to justice for all 
persons,6 the constitution provides for alternative dispute resolution methods by urging the 
promotion of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.7 This constitutional recognition of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is a positive step towards providing the impetus for 
change of attitude and focus from court-oriented litigation to out of court-settlement of disputes. 






                                                          
4 Article 41 (1) Every person has a right to fair labour practices 
                     (2) Every worker has the right to  
                             (a) fair remuneration 
                             (b) to reasonable working conditions 
                             (c) to form, join or participate in the activities and programs  of a trade union; and 
                             (d) to go on strike. 
                 
5 Article 165 (3)(b) of the Constitution provides the High Court with jurisdiction to determine the question as to 
whether a right or fundamental  freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated, infringed or threatened. It is 
noteworthy however that labour disputes are determined by the Industrial Court established under the Industrial 
Courts Act with the status of a High Court. 
6  Article 48. 
7 Article 159 (2) In exercising judicial authority, the courts and the tribunals shall be guided by the following  
principles 
(a) justice shall be done to all irrespective of status; 
(b) justice shall not be delayed; 
(c) alternative forms of dispute resolution including  reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and 




(i) Arbitration under the Arbitration Act of 1995 
According to Muigua,8 arbitration occurs where a neutral third party is appointed by the parties 
to a dispute or by an appointing authority to determine the dispute and give a final and binding 
award. Gakeri 9defines arbitration as an adjudicative process in which parties present evidence 
and arguments to an impartial and independent third party who has the authority to hand down a 
binding decision based on objective standards. Khan, 10on the other hand/further defines 
arbitration as a private consensual process where parties agree to present the dispute to a third 
party for settlement. Arbitration in Kenya is governed by the Arbitration Act of 199511 
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) that defines arbitration in vague terms to mean any arbitration 
whether or not administered by an arbitral institution.12 
Arbitration under the Act is based on the existence of an arbitration agreement that must be 
writing in a document that has been signed by both parties.13 Courts in Kenya have been keen to 
apply the principle of separability, its effect being that when an arbitration agreement is 
incorporated into a contract it assumes an existence independent of the contract.14 Where there is 
such an agreement to arbitrate, either party to the agreement, upon the commencement of any 
suit in court, may apply to the court for an order of stay of proceedings in the court pending the 
determination of the dispute by way of arbitration.15 Notwithstanding the fact that a stay of 
proceedings has been issued, any party is at liberty to apply to the High Court for an interim 
measure.16 This shows that the court still maintains some degree of control over the process of 
arbitration, thus defeating the purpose of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism that promotes out of court settlement of disputes. This contradicts s 10 of the Act that 
provides for non-interference by the court on matters that are subject to the Act. 
                                                          
8 Kariuki Muigua ‘ Alternative Dispute Resolution under the  Article 159 of the Constitution’ Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators (CiArb) Kenya (accessed on 14/09/2015  via www.kmco.co.ke/attachments/article/10 ) 
9 Gakeri op cit  (n2). 
10  Farooq Khan ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ A paper presented at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 
Advanced Arbitration Course held  8 to 9  March 2007 at Nairobi (accessed on 14/09/2015 via www.kmco.co.ke/...).  
11 Arbitration Act, Chapter 49 Laws of Kenya. 
12 Ibid at s 3(1). 
13 Section 4 of the Arbitration Act. 
14 See Kimaru J. in Kenya Airports Parking Ltd and Another vs. Municipal Council of Mombasa HCCC 434 of 2009 
and Gikonyo J. in Infocard Holdings Limited vs. Attorney General & 2 Others (2014) eKLR enforcing Section 17 of 
the Act. 
15 Section 6 of the Arbitration Act. 




Court interference with regard to arbitration under the Act is further illustrated by the fact 
that an arbitral tribunal, or a party with the approval of the tribunal, may request the High Court 
to assist in the taking evidence, which may execute the request within its competence.17 One 
would be behooved to wonder why an arbitral tribunal would require the court’s intervention in 
the taking of evidence, yet arbitration as a process is quasi-judicial in nature. This process has the 
general effect of unduly lengthening the time for the resolution of the dispute. 
At the conclusion of the arbitral process, the arbitral tribunal would make an award that is 
also subject to the possibility of being set aside by the court. Any party to the arbitral 
proceedings may move the court to set aside an award that has been issued on the following 
grounds: 
a. That a party to the arbitration was under some incapacity; or 
b. That the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected t to or the 
laws of Kenya; 
c. The party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of 
the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise not able to present his case; 
d. The arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or falling within the terms of the reference 
to arbitration; 
e. The composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement by the parties; or 
f. The making of the award was induced or affected by fraud, bribery, undue influence or corruption.18 
 
Parties may choose to use any of the above measures to challenge and render an award 
invalidated by the court. As earlier stated, this would defeat the purpose of having a process that 
is out of court in the event that the parties eventually revert to court for  to set aside the award. 
On conclusion of the arbitration process, the parties must deposit the original award or a certified 
copy of the award to the High Court for it to be enforced by the court.19 The courts’ supervision 
of the arbitration process is indicative of a system that is not supportive of out-of-court 
settlement of disputes. It is the purpose of this research to investigate how to change this 
position, especially with regard to the settlement of industrial disputes. 
 
 
                                                          
17 Section 28 of the Arbitration Act. 
18 Section 35. 




(ii) Mediation of Disputes 
Mediation is defined as a voluntary, informal, consensual, strictly confidential and non-
binding dispute resolution process in which a neutral third party helps the parties to reach a 
negotiated settlement or solution.20 It is also defined as the intervention in a dispute or 
negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-
making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable 
settlement in respect of the issues that are in dispute.21Thus, as unlike in arbitration, a mediator 
plays a facilitative role of helping disputing parties to reach their own negotiated settlement. 
According to Muigua,22 the constitutionalisation of mediation in Kenya means that in the policy 
on the resolution of conflicts, there will be a paradigm shift towards encouraging mediation and 
the other traditional means of conflict management, as opposed to the formal mechanism. 
 However, as an informal or non-formal process, Kenya lacks an act of Parliament or 
legislation that would set appropriate structures for the promotion of mediation as an alternative 
dispute resolution process. According to Berkovitch, 23since mediation is in essence a form of 
assisted negotiation, it does not have a direct legal basis, and the parties do not have to have a 
written agreement. He states, however, that mediation outcome is binding because the parties 
have chosen to undertake it voluntarily.24 The lack of a legal basis for mediation and its 
informality may at times make the parties regard the outcome of the process as non-binding in 
nature. Thus, to prevent this from happening, the terms of the settlement reached are usually 
reduced into a written agreement executed by the parties and witnessed to and attested by the 
mediator.  
Mediation has various advantages that can be applied in resolving industrial disputes. 
Mediation is generally expeditious and time saving in nature, thus fulfilling the objective of 
giving parties access to justice that is not delayed.25 
                                                          
20Fenn. ‘Introduction to Civil and Commercial Mediation’ Workbook on Mediation Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 
as cited in Muigua n8. 
21 Moore C The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (1996) 14 as cited in Muigua n8.  
22 Muigua op cit (n8). 
23Berkovitch ‘Mediation Success or Failure: A Search for the Elusive criteria’ Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 289, p.290 as cited in Muigua n8. 
24 Ibid. 




However, as noted by Muigua,26 mediation is only time saving and expeditious when both 
parties enter the mediation with goodfaith.27 Where the parties lack goodfaith to negotiate by 
making concessions, then the mediation generally becomes a longer and more tedious process, 
further compounded by the lack of formality of the process. The expeditious nature of mediation 
also in essence also means that mediation, as a process, is cost effective in the sense that it is less 
costly as compared to litigation in courts. The only rider to the cost-effective nature of mediation 
is when the process fails and the parties have to resort to litigation.28 Mediation is also a flexible 
process, which can be customised by the parties in dispute to be able to work within busy 
schedules in the resolution of the dispute. 
Notwithstanding the various advantages mentioned above, mediation does not address the 
issue of power imbalance, which may be present in industrial dispute resolution. As noted by 
Kahn-Freund,29 there is inherently an imbalance of power in an employment relationship. This is 
because the employer is the resource owner and appropriator while the employee is heavily 
reliant on the employer. According to Kahn-Freund, one of the main purposes of labour law is to 
address the inherent imbalance in employment relationship, which is done through collective 
bargaining rights. Manning 30 suggests that power imbalance may originate from various sources, 
including those derived from financial resources, knowledge and skill in negotiating, access to 
decision makers, personal respect and friendships.31 A concern raised in mediation is that if there 
is too great an imbalance of power, it may affect parties’ freedom in the process, which may 
result in a biased outcome of one party over the other. Thus for a mediation process to be 
successful and legitimate, it should be able to deal fairly with a power imbalance that may be 
present in the process.32 
Mediation as a process can therefore, can be easily adapted and utilised in the resolution and 
settlement of industrial disputes in Kenya by the setting up of structures that will address the 
challenges mentioned above. 
 
                                                          
26  Muigua  op cit (Supra n8). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 P Davies &  M Freedland Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (1983) at 18.  






(b) Industrial Dispute Resolution in Kenya 
The main alternative dispute resolution process that is applied in the resolution of industrial 
disputes under the Labour Relations Act of 2007 is the process of conciliation. Conciliation is a 
process in which a neutral third party called a conciliator restores damaged relationships between 
disputing parties by bringing them together, clarifying perceptions and pointing out 
misperceptions.33 Conciliation is preferred in industrial dispute resolution as it is focused on the 
restoration of on-going relationships generally characteristic of industrial relationships. It is also 
used in situations in which the parties are either unwilling or unable to come to the bargaining 
table.34 Section 15 of the Industrial Court Act provides for settlement of industrial disputes by 
way of conciliation.35 Under s15 (2) of this Act, the court may refuse to determine any dispute 
that has been brought before it if it is not satisfied that appropriate dispute resolution 
mechanisms have been applied.36 This makes provision for court-annexed alternative dispute 
resolution, where the ADR mechanisms are applied not by consent of the parties but by operation 
of law and court order. The effectiveness of such is debatable as parties could bargain out of 
coercion. It however creates an avenue for prevention and avoidance of litigation. 
The process commences by the making of a formal report of the trade dispute to the minister 
in charge of labour affairs either by the trade union or the employers’ union.37Individual 
employers and employees are also allowed to make such references to the minister. This is in 
line with the requirements of access to justice under the Constitution,38 as earlier stated in this 
chapter. 
                                                          
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid. 
35 ‘Section 15 (1) Nothing in this Act may be construed as precluding the Court from adopting and implementing, on 
its own motion or at the request of the parties any other appropriate means of dispute resolution, including internal 
methods, conciliation, mediation and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in accordance with Article 159(2)(c) 
of the Constitution.  Is this a direct quote?      If so it needs to be in quotation marks.                             
 
36 Though various alternative dispute resolution methods are mentioned, the Industrial Courts Act has a bias on 
conciliation, and this bias is evident in s 15(3) that requires the court to be furnished with a certificate from the 
conciliator certifying that there has been an attempt to settle the dispute through conciliation and that the dispute 
remains unsettled even after conciliation. 
37 Section 62(1) of the Labour Relations Act. 




Once the dispute has been reported, every party has the right to file a written statement in 
reply to the reference of the dispute to the minister. Failure to file a written statement does not of 
itself invalidate the reference of the dispute to the minister.39 Interested parties are also allowed 
to file their statements of interest.40 The minister then appoints a conciliator to conciliate the 
dispute, unless the conciliation procedure in an applicable collective agreement that is binding to 
the parties has not been exhausted,41 or a law or collective agreement binding on both parties 
prohibits negotiation on the issue in dispute.42 This is indicative of a labour relations system that 
puts heavy emphasis on party autonomy in dispute resolution with heavy reliance on the 
collective agreements that may have been signed by the parties. The collective agreement could 
prohibit any kind of negotiation on the issue in question, in which case the minister does not 
have the requisite legal authority to appoint a conciliator to conciliate the dispute on the 
prohibited issue.43 
The conciliator(s) will then attempt to resolve the dispute within 30 days of their 
appointment, or any extended period as may have been agreed by the parties to the dispute.44 
Under s 67 (2) of the Labour Relations Act, the conciliator or the conciliation committee has the 
power to: 
(a) Mediate between parties; 
(b) Conduct fact finding exercise; and 
(c) Make recommendations or proposals to the parties for settling the dispute. 
 
 If the trade dispute is resolved in conciliation, it is reduced to an agreement the terms of 
which are recorded in writing and signed by the parties and the conciliator. A signed copy of the 
agreement is then lodged with the minister.45 If the dispute is deemed to have been unresolved, 
the conciliator issues a certificate to that effect and any party to the dispute may refer it to the 
Industrial Court for adjudication.46The Labour Relations Act does not provide for the formal 
                                                          
39 Section 63. 
40 Section 64. 
41 Section 65 (a). 
42 Section 65 (b). 
43 As much as s 65 (b) of the Labour Relations Act indicates that parties may by collective agreement restrict or even 
prohibit negotiation, this is a very rare occurrence in Kenya. 
44 Section 67(1) L.R.A. 
45 Section 68 LRA. 




process of resolving disputes through arbitration since after conciliation, the parties may refer the 
dispute to the Industrial Court. It however, gives parties the autonomy to select and set an 
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism in their collective bargaining agreement that they 
lodge in court. The act provides that an employer, or a group of employers and a trade union may 
conclude a collective agreement providing for the conciliation of any category of trade disputes 
identified in the collective agreement by an independent and impartial conciliator appointed by 
agreement between the parties; and arbitration of any category of trade disputes identifiable in 
the collective agreement by an independent and impartial arbitrator appointed by the agreement 
between the parties.47  
 Thus from the forgoing that the Industrial Court will only refer a matter to arbitration 
when the parties to the collective bargaining agreement have clearly provided for and stipulated 
it in their collective bargaining agreement. In the case of Kenya Chemical and Allied Workers 
Union vs. East African Portland Cement and Company Limited48 the Industrial Court was 
confronted with a situation in which a trade dispute had been referred to the minister who then 
appointed a conciliator in accordance with the procedure discussed above. The conciliator was 
however unable to reach an amicable solution for both parties, and thus the dispute ended up at 
the Industrial Court. The court declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the dispute since the 
collective bargaining agreement provided for arbitration and the parties had not exhausted that 
option.49 The court stated as follows: 
 
‘The CBA contained a valid arbitration agreement. No arbitration has taken place. Conciliation by 
the Minister is a statutory process, overseen by the State. It is a public process, not a private 
mechanism. It is not arbitration. Arbitration is a private dispute resolution mechanism. There is no 
evidence that arbitration has been exhausted. There is no record of any arbitration proceedings. 
There is no award from any arbitral panel in the records filed by the parties. The Industrial Court 
will only be involved in an appeal against the arbitration award, in setting aside the arbitration 
award, or in enforcement of the arbitration award. The court has not been asked to exercise any of 
these functions, but is being asked to determine the matter directly, in a case where the CBA 
contains a valid arbitration agreement. The Industrial Court can only come in in the aid of the 
arbitration process and not to assume the role of the arbitrator.’50 
 
                                                          
47 Section 58 L.R.A. 







 It seems therefore, that any arbitration agreement that is stipulated in the collective 
bargaining agreement that has been signed by the parties can still be subject of review and setting 
aside by the Industrial Court. With regard to an appeal against the arbitration award, the Labour 
Relations Act provides that an award in arbitration, in terms of a collective bargaining agreement 
is final and binding, and is subject to appeal on points of law to any court.  It may also be set 
aside by the Industrial Court on any ground recognised by law, or be enforced by the Industrial 
Court.51 It is thus clear that arbitration is still subject to a court’s interference, which thus defeats 
the entire purpose of it being an alternative dispute resolution method as was discussed in the 
earlier section of this chapter. 
 The jurisdiction of the Industrial Court includes the following disputes: 
(1) Disputes relating to or arising out of employment between an employer and employee; 
(2) Disputes between an employer and a trade union; 
(3) Disputes between an employer’s organization and a trade union organization; 
(4) Disputes between trade unions; 
(5) |Disputes between employers organizations; 
(6) Disputes between an employer’s organization and a member of the organization; 
(7) Disputes between a trade union and a member of the union; 
(8) Disputes regarding the registration of a trade union and its officials; and 
(9) Disputes regarding the registration of an employer’s organization and the election of its 
officials. 
 Unlike in jurisdictions where there is a distinction between disputes of right and disputes 
of interest, more so with regard to application, the Kenyan Labour Relations Act makes no such 
distinction. This Act defines a trade dispute is defined by the Kenyan Labour Relations Act i as a 
dispute or a difference, or an apprehended dispute or difference, between employers and 
employees, between employers and trade unions, or between an employer’s organization and 
trade union. These differences can be about any employment matter and include disputes 
regarding the dismissal, suspension or redundancy of employees, allocation of work and 
                                                          




recognition of a trade union.52 This non-distinction is in the favor of employees, who may 
register a trade dispute on any matter touching on the issue of employment. 
 
II. CONCLUSION 
It is evident that, even though the Kenyan Constitution makes a provision for alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms to be applied in the resolution of disputes, there is need for 
reform and development of the law relating to dispute resolution, especially industrial dispute 
resolution in order to promote the expedient and efficient resolution of industrial disputes. There 
is need for the Kenyan system to find and strike a balance between recognising the right of 
review of arbitration of industrial disputes versus the need for achieving arbitral finality. The 
next chapter analyses the global framework for industrial dispute resolution, commencing with 

















                                                          






GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter of this work set out an overview of the industrial dispute resolution framework 
in Kenya. It was noted that there has been a general shift from manufacturing to service-based 
industries, which has necessitated the emergence of reliance on human capital to drive the 
service-based industry. This has resulted in increase in industrial disputes53. It was also noted 
that in the past, Kenyan courts took a conservative approach to dispute resolution, holding the 
view that they held the absolute traditional position as the sole avenue for dispute resolution. It 
has been noted however, that this view has changed as the courts are increasingly being 
overwhelmed with work. Additionally, the need for timeous and expeditious resolution of cases 
has led to the acceptance of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration and 
mediation in the resolution of disputes. 
The chapter noted that as a central point, the Kenyan Constitution, in addition to 
recognising the right to fair labour practices in art 41 (4),54 also provides for the responsibility of 
the state to ensure access to justice for all persons.55 The Constitution also provides for the 
promotion of alternative forms of dispute resolution, to wit, reconciliation, mediation, arbitration 
and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.56 This constitutional anchorage, as was set out in 
the past chapter, raises optimism for the continued promotion of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, especially in the resolution of industrial disputes. 
 The first chapter concluded with an attempt at demonstrating the nature and scope of 
judicial control over the alternative dispute resolution process in industrial disputes in Kenya, 
especially where there is in force a valid arbitration agreement in a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
                                                          
53 Discussed at length in Supra n.1 
54 If this refers to the Bill of Rights it needs to quoted fully. 
55 Article 48 of the Kenyan Constitution 




 This second chapter analyses the global framework for industrial dispute 
resolution. It commences with a discussion on balancing the right to finality of an industrial 
arbitration award without downplaying the fairness requirement.  
 This chapter also analyses the international law background to industrial dispute 
resolution by conducting an analysis of the International Labour Organisation (I.L.O.) 
framework and in particular: the I.L.O. Labour Disputes Systems Guidelines for Improved 
Performance; the I.L.O. Recommendation number 92 on Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration, 
;as well as the I.L.O. Examination of Grievance Recommendation. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to derive inspiration from the global framework on industrial dispute resolution in 
order to suggest the policy and legal amendments necessary for restructuring the design of the 
industrial dispute resolution system in Kenya. 
(a) Balancing the Finality Expectation with the Right of Review of an Arbitration Award 
Arbitration, as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, is intended to offer a forum for the 
expeditious resolution of industrial disputes. This is because courts and the litigation process 
have generally been proven to be lengthy and arduous, involving the use of state organs in the 
form of the judiciary. Industrial disputes, by their very nature, require expeditious resolution. 
This is illustrated in the point made in the introduction to this work: that the economic shift to 
service-based work environment necessitates the speedy resolution of industrial disputes as to 
ensure that the operations of the work force are not destabilized.  This is because a 
destabilization.  Destabilization of the work and labour environment would have a ripple effect 
leading to the destabilization of the economy. 
According to Anyim et al, 57 there are three social partners who are affected in the occurrence 
of an industrial dispute. The work identifies them as government, labour and the management.58 
The total and general costs incurred in industrial dispute resolution usually outweigh the benefits 
that accrue from the process. Quoting from Imberman, 59 with regard to strikes in particular, he 
states that trade disputes have great bearing on the smooth and orderly development of the 
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economy and the maintenance of law and order in society.60 He further quotes Ubeku, 61  stating 
that industrial disputes such as strikes have a dramatic effect on the public especially with regard 
to such industrial disputes arising in the essential services industries. 
It is because of the effect of industrial disputes have on the society, including the public who 
are not party to the dispute, that there is an overriding public policy need for the speedy 
resolution of industrial disputes. To this end, the use of various forms of alternative dispute 
resolution methods and mechanisms, as discussed in the first chapter, is encouraged, in the 
anticipation that such methods would be conclusive in the settlement of the disputes. This section 
discusses arbitration as such a method, as it is the most legally binding alternative dispute 
resolution process used in the resolution of industrial disputes, compared with the other methods 
such as mediation and negotiation. 
Abedian,62 while commenting on arbitration in an international context, states that where the 
parties have agreed that their dispute be resolved through a private forum, in this case arbitration, 
judicial review of the award would in principle clash with the contractual expectation of the 
parties to the extent that they have agreed to submit to the ruling of such a private forum.63 The 
suggestion made in this work is that the same underlying principle could be stated with regard to 
the arbitration of local industrial disputes. There is an inherent legitimate expectation that the 
submission to arbitration of an industrial or industry related dispute, would lead to a conclusive 
settlement of that dispute without necessitating the intervention of the court. This would 
generally be classified as the legitimate expectation to the finality of the arbitration award. 
As much as there is a general expectation that the arbitration award would be final and 
binding on the parties ─ more so in a contractual situation where the arbitration process is 
enshrined in the agreement made by the parties ─ there remains a residual expectation of some 
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level of public scrutiny of the award. This is especially in cases where its fairness is in question. 
To this point, Abedian64 notes as follows: 
It is, on the other hand, important to note that the absence of significant erosion of judicial scrutiny would 
adversely affect the victims of manifestly flawed arbitrations….the possibility of judicial scrutiny of an 
arbitral award at the seat of arbitration enhances the integrity and efficiency of the arbitral proceedings: it 
reduces the risk of the rendering of arbitrary decisions by some arbitrators, increasing the trust of the 
business community in international arbitrations.65 
Although the point made in the above statement relates to international arbitration, it can 
be extended to the arbitration of industrial disputes, and generally to all manner of arbitration of 
disputes. If arbitrators were given the unfettered right to final decisions that could not be subject 
to review, then such manifest powers would easily be prone to abuse and the victims would have 
no recourse whatsoever and no remedy. This would be contrary to the principle that equity 
suffers no wrong without a remedy.66 
From the foregoing, it is imperative to strike a near perfect balance between the 
competing legitimate expectations of finality of the arbitral award, with the right to review the 
award by a party who is adversely affected by it. Any such balance of the two legitimate 
expectations would need to take into account the functional role that is played by arbitration.67 
According to Schmitz, 68 finality has been the functional corner stone of arbitration, in that it has 
allowed arbitration to develop as a private, flexible and self-contained process regarded as more 
efficient than litigation both in terms of time and expense.69He also mentions flexibility of the 
process and privacy as critical advantages that would necessitate the arbitral award being final. 
In respect of the flexibility of the arbitration process, he states that the independence of the 
arbitration process from the judicial system is a central advantage to its being a viable form of 
alternative dispute resolution, in the sense that it not only eases the burden of dispute resolution 
from the courts but also provides equitable application of the law in the particular dispute.70 With 
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regard to the application of arbitration in industrial disputes, Schmitz states that, due to its 
flexible nature, arbitration is suitable for an employee who has an equitably strong but legally 
weak case.71 This is, however, debatable in that arbitral tribunals are bound to follow the law. 
Few scholars have suggested effective means of striking the desired balance between the 
double tenets of legitimate expectation ─ these being the expectation of finality and the 
expectation of fairness ─ and the right of review that is afforded to an aggrieved person in the 
case of erroneous or unfair arbitration awards. However, as noted by Abedian, 72 the most 
popular view on striking this delicate balance is that of allowing for the review of an award 
based on procedural irregularities or a violation of public policy considerations.73 This he notes 
is the approach adopted by the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) under its art34.This 
approach of excluding  the issue of the merits of the award from being the subject of review by a 
court of law is arguably one of the most effective methods of striking the balance. This could, 
however, still be prone to misuse as aggrieved parties who would otherwise have accepted the 
results of the arbitral award would then use the excuse of some procedural technicality to invoke 
the court’s judicial intervention. 
A second approach identified by Hossein74 is that of limiting the review of the arbitration 
award and restricting it to questions of law. This approach, though broader in nature, would be 
more applicable to appeals from awards rather than from the review of the awards. This is 
because facts would have already been established by the arbitrator or arbitral panel and thus the 
court to which the appeal has been preferred would only have to deal with the substantive issues 
of law. This approach conforms to the traditional role played by the court and thus may not be 
desirable. 
Another approach suggested by this work, is to have an arbitral award reviewed by 
another arbitral tribunal independent from the supervision and control of the judiciary. This 
approach would ensure that an aggrieved party still has the opportunity to address the necessary 
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forum and to air any grievances or disagreements as to the nature or outcome of the arbitral 
award to another arbitral panel. This would ensure that the benefits of arbitration as a process in 
the speedy resolution of disputes, that is, flexibility and privacy are still maintained while 
guaranteeing an independent review of the award75.  
This chapter will now discuss international law articles and recommendations with a view 
to identifying the global framework used for industrial dispute resolution. Inspired by the 
processes followed internationally, the chapter proposes recommendations regarding the reform 
of the Kenyan industrial dispute resolution framework.  
(b) The International Labour Organisation (I.L.O) 
According to Sengenberger,76 the I.L.O. was founded in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles 
and became the first specialized agency of the United Nations which embodies a vision of 
universal, humane conditions of labour to attain social justice and peace among the 
nations.77Article 1 of the I.L.O. Constitution states that the function of the I.L. O is the 
promotion of the objects which have been detailed in the preamble as follows: 
Whereas universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice; And whereas 
conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to 
produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled; and an improvement of those 
conditions is urgently required; as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including the 
establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of 
unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease 
and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young persons and women, provision for 
old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, 
recognition of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value, recognition of the principle of 
freedom of association, the organization of vocational and technical education and other measures; Whereas 
also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations 
which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries; The High Contracting Parties, moved by 
sentiments of justice and humanity as well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world, and with 
a view to attaining the objectives set forth in this Preamble, agree to the following Constitution of the 
International Labour Organization78 
It is noteworthy that the preamble does not in any way allude to any method of dispute 
resolution in the industrial sector, but it does state in its opening sentence that universal and 
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lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice. As observed by Kamenka, 79 
the concept of justice presupposes conflict, and there is no problem of justice and no perception 
of it, where there are no conflicts.80 On this issue, Chesler81 notes as follows: 
Most protracted conflicts (disputes) have their roots in perceived injustice…Thus, surfacing and escalating 
conflict often is part of a group’s conscious strategy designed to require the other parties to pay attention to 
the issues, to get them to “come to the table” to begin discussions on bargaining, to pressure and threaten 
others in the effort to gain different allocation of resources, and to pursue their conceptions of social 
justice.82 
It is indeed correct that the whole concept of justice arose due to the occurrence of 
conflicts that were initiated because of apparent injustice. The concept and strategy of the use of 
conflict by a group to get the other group to bargain is often applied in industrial disputes, more 
so in interest-based disputes. Thus it can be safely assumed that the purpose of the I.L.O., in its 
determination to ensure realisation of social justice, also entails a commitment to ensure and 
promote the best mechanism to be used in dispute resolution, one  that would ensure social 
justice is attained by all. According to Bush,83 social justice generally refers to a state of affairs 
in which inequality of wealth, power, access and privilege ─ inequalities which affect not only 
individuals but classes of people ─ are eliminated or greatly decreased.84 It is the very existence 
of such inequalities  that in a great way contribute to the emergence of disputes  that need to be 
resolved using the appropriate means and methods of dispute resolution. 
Alternative dispute resolution methods are highly applicable and the most favourable 
methods of attaining social justice are through the resolution of disputes and conflicts that arise 
as a normal occurrence. The preference for the use of alternative dispute resolution methods in 
the resolution of such disputes and conflicts lies in the advantages that such methods have as 
compared to the settlement of the disputes by recourse to the court-mandated processes. To this 
end, the I.L.O. does promote the application of alternative dispute resolution methods in the 
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resolution of industrial disputes. This is in harmony and synchrony with the purposes of the 
I.L.O. mission of promoting social justice. 
Muigua85 analyses the structural advantages that alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms have in conflict resolution ─ this being part of the process towards the attainment of 
social justice. He states that ADR Mechanisms, such as negotiation and mediation, seek to 
address the root cause of the conflict. This is unlike litigation, which concerns itself in reaching a 
settlement, as settlement. Settlement implies that the parties have to come to an accommodation 
with which they have to live due to the anarchical nature of society and its role in power 
relationships.86 The nature of alternative dispute resolution methods in addressing the root cause 
of the conflict is particularly important, especially since parties in social justice contexts usually 
need to maintain an ongoing relationship. 
 In concluding this section, this work recommends that in promoting the realisation and 
achievement of social justice in the context of the resolution of disputes, the I.L.O ought to 
promote the use of alternative dispute resolution methods in the resolution of industrial disputes. 
The next section of this work discusses the II.L.O. Labour Disputes System Guidelines for 
Improved Performance. 
(i) Analysis of the International Labour Organisation Labour Dispute System Guidelines 
for Improved Performance  
The I.L.O Dispute Systems Guidelines have been developed to help individual states devise a 
more effective dispute resolution framework, especially in the case of labour and industrial 
dispute resolution. The foreword to the document states as : 
Dispute prevention and resolution is today attracting more and more attention, as the effective prevention 
and resolution of labour disputes is critical for sound and productive employment relations worldwide. 
Dispute resolution processes offer a collective bargaining resource to the interested parties, and strengthen 
social partnerships. As conflict is inherent to and inevitable in employment relationships, establishing 
effective dispute prevention and resolution processes is key to minimizing the occurrence and 
consequences of workplace conflict. It is with this in mind that the guide aims to assist practitioners 
working to establish, assess, and improve such processes. Many countries have put in place dispute 
prevention and resolution systems, both inside and outside their ministries of labour, with different 
organizational structures and roles. The International Labour Organization has been assisting member 
                                                          






States, as well as workers and employers’ organizations, to set up, or strengthen, such systems. This guide 
is part of the ILO’s ’s effort to strengthen the prevention and resolution of labour disputes by providing 
advice to both ILO’s constituents and industrial relations practitioners interested in dispute resolution. It 
provides advice on the e steps to be taken to either revitalize an existing system, or establish an independent 
institution, ensuring that they operate efficiently and provide effective dispute resolution services.87 
Such acknowledgment is illustrative of the increasing inherency of conflict in any employment 
relations and validates the view, that the resolution of disputes is central to the attainment of 
social justice, as articulated in the previous session. The step taken by the I.L.O. in recognizing 
the role of dispute resolution in such a process can be seen thus a positive step. 
The guidelines commence by recognizing that industrial disputes generally arise from 
power imbalances and a perceived competition for power and influence by the various parties in 
industrial relations.88 Thus, in the resolution of industrial disputes, any such processes must take 
into account and effectively handle the apparent or perceived power imbalances that are inherent 
in the system. To this extent, the guidelines define power as the ability to influence others, as a 
result of the position a person or an institution holds, the technical competence and ability of a 
person or institution and the personal characteristics of the persons who are interacting.89 
Employers have thus traditionally been considered to have more power and influence by virtue 
of the resources they have at their disposal over their employees. Labour systems in individual 
states have attempted to address this apparent imbalance in power and influence by providing for 
collective bargaining arrangements and the right to form trade unions.90 
While taking note of the inevitability of occurrence of conflict in the workplace, the 
guidelines suggest that such inevitability is due to the nature of the ever- conflicting interests 
between the various actors in industrial relations.91 Thus addressing the conflicting interests with 
a view of harmonizing them will be pivotal to the resolution of the disputes. To this end, the 
guidelines note as follows: 
Conflict and disputes can be minimized, but the nature of employee-employer interactions in a market 
economy point to the inevitability of conflict. Industrial relations in a market economy accepts and 
recognizes that employees and management have a separation of interests and that some conflict is 
inevitable and needs to be managed. Conflict may manifest itself as a dispute. The separation of interests, 
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however, does not have to mean constant disputes. Employees and employers can work together to resolve 
their differences and reach a common understanding without disagreements escalating into formal disputes. 
The conflicting interest creates the need to discuss and negotiate, while the common interest provides the 
impetus to reach compromise and agreement. Disputes can be prevented and resolved by the action of the 
parties themselves, without the intervention of third parties. It may also be prevented or resolved by 
services provided by State-supported or operated bodies, or private sector operators. An effective dispute 
management system aims for prevention in the first instance, and subsequently for the orderly and peaceful 
resolution of any disputes that arise in spite of preventive efforts, primarily through the efforts of the 
disputing parties themselves.92 
Key to the above statement is the recommendation in the guidelines that an effective 
dispute resolution system should be aimed at the prevention of the dispute at first instance. This 
would seem to be contradicting the earlier finding that disputes are basically inevitable due to the 
power imbalances and the conflicting interests between the parties. However, the aim of that 
recommendation can be construed to be a minimization of the occurrence of disputes rather than 
a complete prevention of their occurrence, which is an ideal that may not be easily attained.  
Another key recommendation in the above guideline is that the peaceful resolution of 
industrial disputes should be primarily through the efforts of the disputing parties 
themselves.93This is in harmony with the idea that disputes arise basically because of divergent 
interests of the parties involved. According to Ury,94 in interest-based dispute resolution, the 
parties do take a central role in the resolution of the disputes, as it is indeed they who know and 
appreciate the nature of their interests.95 Thus, the proposal for reform of the Kenyan industrial 
dispute resolution system should take into account the underlying interests of the parties and 
provide a framework by which the parties can solve their disputes with minimal third party 
intervention. The guidelines strongly advise recommend that a consensus-based approach be 
implemented in respect of an industrial dispute resolution. This would be more effective than the 
use of power or force ─ both of which are usually applied when a dispute moves to the purview 
and ambit of a court and litigation processes. 
This section concludes with the suggestion that the recommendation expressed in the 
guidelines should also considered in the event of any amendments being made in respect of the 
Kenyan  industrial resolution framework. The Kenyan system needs to move from an adversarial 
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system of industrial dispute resolution to a more consensus-based system that addresses the 
underlying concerns and interests of the various parties to a dispute. The next section discusses 
the I.L.O. Recommendation 92 on Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration. 
 
(ii) Analysis of the I.L.O. Recommendation Number 92 on Voluntary Conciliation and 
Arbitration 
The I.L.O. passed the Recommendation on Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration on 6 
June 1951 with an intention of creating a framework guideline on voluntary conciliation and 
arbitration in industrial disputes. The Recommendation suggests the setting up of appropriate 
conciliatory machinery to assist in the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes between 
employers and workers.96According to this recommendation, the conciliation machinery would 
first and foremost be voluntary in nature and secondly come to play not only in the resolution of 
industrial disputes but also in the prevention of the disputes. This recommendation applies to the 
Kenyan system as the system only provides for a compulsory conciliation process after a dispute 
has already been referred.97 This would thus be a point of call for system reform to create a 
conciliation institutional framework to encourage dialogue and a prevention of the occurrence of 
a dispute or conflict. The voluntary nature of the process would be more effective in ensuring the 
parties relate and dialogue with goodfaith and would also ensure that are able to abide by the 
settlement that is agreed upon after the process. The I.L.O. labour legislation guidelines 
distinction between conciliation and mediation in the following terms: 
In some countries, conciliation and mediation refer to the same type of procedure, while in others they 
denote distinct procedures. However, in both cases they consist of a means of assisting the parties to the 
dispute, through neutral third party intervention, to reach a mutually agreed settlement. The conciliator or 
mediator assists the parties to settle the dispute by themselves when negotiations have failed or reached an 
impasse. The conciliator or mediator is not empowered to impose a settlement on the parties. 
Conciliation/mediation in its least interventionist form is the most widely used method of dispute 
settlement under government auspices. In most industrialized market economy countries, it is by far the 
most common procedure employed for the settlement of collective interest disputes. Voluntary arbitration 
tends to be used much less frequently, if at all. While conciliation or mediation is the primary method used 
to resolve interests or collective labour disputes, it is often a compulsory preliminary step before the 
adjudication of a rights or individual dispute. Mediation is sometimes distinguished from conciliation as a 
separate method of dispute settlement in cases where, even though the dispute still has to be settled by 
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agreement of the parties, the third party is somewhat more active than in conciliation and may have the 
authority (and in some cases the duty) to submit formal proposals for the settlement of the dispute. A 
distinction between conciliation and mediation is sometimes found in labour legislation, although it is not 
always reflected in the legislative definition of "mediation".98 
It can be seen from the above that, conciliation, being more voluntary and non-coercive 
in nature, can be used in pre-dispute prevention procedure. Mediation on the other hand, being a 
more coercive process by a third party, can be used in a situation where there is an already 
existing dispute that needs to be resolved. 
 In order to promote goodfaith in the dispute resolution process through conciliation, the 
recommendation states that if a dispute has been submitted to conciliation with the consent of the 
parties concerned, the parties should be encouraged to abstain from strikes and lockouts while 
the conciliation process is still ongoing.99 This recommendation is worded as an encouragement 
rather than a mandatory recommendation primarily because the parties have a constitutional right 
to engage in a strike and a lockout.100 The same encouragement provisions are stated with regard 
to voluntary arbitration.101However noteworthy even though arbitration can be commenced on a 
voluntary nature, once an arbitration award has been granted it becomes binding on the parties 
who were subject to the arbitration process. 
II. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analyzed various issues in industrial dispute resolution from an international 
perspective. First, the chapter engaged in a debate on achieving the perfect balance between the 
legitimate expectations of finality in an industrial arbitration award, versus the expectation of 
fairness that comes with the right to seek a review of the arbitral award. This chapter has 
suggested a different approach ─ that of having another appellate arbitral tribunal take charge of 
the review of an arbitral award. This could serve as a compromise strategy that would realize the 
benefits of arbitration as an out-of-court process for the settlement of disputes while retaining the 
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right of an aggrieved party to review the award. The practicalities of this approach, however, still 
need to be debated further.  
 This chapter has also discussed the I.L.O’s commitment to social justice and has 
illustrated the fact that if social justice to be attainable, there an effective and efficient industrial 
dispute resolution system must be in place ─ since disputes and conflicts are inevitable in any 
society.  
 Finally, also discussed is a proposal for the reform of the Kenyan system aimed at 
encouraging the prevention of industrial disputes rather than their resolution once they have 
arisen. Conciliation could be used in the furtherance of that aim, as it is a process that encourages 
the building and formation of consensus. The next chapter of this work analyses the South 
African industrial dispute resolution system  and draws similarities and differences between it  
and the  system in Kenya ; the ultimate aim  here being to propose reforms to the Kenyan system 

















SOUTH AFRICAN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter of this work discussed the global framework for industrial dispute 
resolution. It commenced with a discussion on balancing the expectation of finality with the right 
of review of an industrial arbitration award. It was noted that arbitration, as an alternative dispute 
resolution process, is intended to offer a forum for the expeditious resolution of industrial 
disputes, because the nature of industrial disputes requires their expeditious resolution. This is 
because, as was noted, industrial disputes have far-reaching consequences for society, as they 
interrupt the smooth and orderly development of the economy and the maintenance of law and 
order.  Furthermore, what needs to be put in place is a system that not only expedites the 
resolution of such industrial disputes, but also provides both procedural and substantive fairness.  
As was further noted, arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution process is intended 
to be final and conclusive, and exclusive of the court process, especially in situations where the 
parties have entered into an agreement that clearly stipulates the finality of arbitration. However, 
an arbitration process that would be entirely immune from review would cause injustice to the 
victims if the process were flawed.102 The second chapter thus analyzed three different 
approaches to striking the balance between fairness and finality. The first was to restrict review 
to procedural irregularities, the second to restrict the review to questions of law, and the third 
was in the form of a suggestion that arbitral awards should be reviewed by another arbitral 
tribunal independent of the supervision and control of the judiciary. 
 
The second chapter also discussed the I.L.O framework for the promotion of alternative 
dispute resolution. It was noted that by  promoting social justice, the I.L.O. was indirectly  also 
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promoting the best mechanism for dispute resolution, one  that would ensure the realization of 
social justice, as most conflicts and disputes originate from perceived injustices. The chapter also 
analyzed the I.L.O.’s Labour Dispute System guidelines for improved performance whose 
purpose, as was noted, is to help individual states to arrive at a more effective dispute resolution 
framework. It was also noted that the guidelines established the inevitability of conflict due to 
the inherent power imbalance in an employment relationship. With this in mind,   it was shown 
the guidelines recommend that an effective dispute resolution mechanism should be aimed, in the 
first instance, at the prevention of a dispute. Another key recommendation made was that the 
peaceful resolution of industrial disputes should primarily be through the efforts of the disputing 
parties themselves. This would be giving effect to the non-coercive forms of alternative dispute 
resolution that would focus on the primary disputants themselves. 
In conclusion the second chapter discussed the I.L.O. Recommendation Number 92 on 
Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration, noting that the promotion of a voluntary means of 
dispute resolution will ensure that parties would be able to dialogue in good faith, as well as 
promoting the prevention of disputes from arising. This is in direct contrast to the Kenyan 
framework that provides for compulsory conciliation and compulsory arbitration when an 
agreement to arbitrate is in force. 
This third chapter analyses the South African industrial dispute resolution system for 
comparative purposes. It discusses the South African system in the light of recommendations 
made in the second chapter of this work. The chapter thus begins by analyzing the impact of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 on the resolution of industrial disputes and 
then discusses the dispute resolution procedure enshrined in South Africa’s Labour Relations Act 
of 1995. The discussion in this chapter describe similarities between Kenya and South Africa, 
and draw a comparison between the South African model used in industrial dispute resolution 







(a)  Impact of the South African Constitution  
  Constitutions play the role of a foundational ‘grundnorm’, the basis on which modern 
governments and states run. Thus entrenchment of values and principles in a constitution gives 
the values a greater force in law, as opposed to situations in which they are merely recognized by 
legislation.  Constitutions are said to be an embodiment of the will of the people, 103unlike acts of 
parliament, which are considered to be reflective of the will of the legislature.104 Thus when an 
ideal is constitutionalized it is given greater legitimacy and authority in terms of enforcement as 
compared to situations in which it is   reflected in the statutory books.  
 Unlike the Kenyan Constitution, the South African Constitution does not refer directly to 
alternative dispute resolution methods of resolving civil disputes.105However, a possible 
inference can be drawn from s34 that states that everyone has the right to have any dispute, 
which can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court, or 
where appropriate, another impartial tribunal or forum.106 Thus this creates a possibility for 
legislative development and promotion of alternative dispute resolution methods. Just as is 
common in any other jurisdiction, the cost of litigation in South Africa is prohibitive and 
impedes an access to justice. It is for that reason that alternative dispute resolution methods 
appear to be an attractive option for dispute resolution and settlement in South Africa.  
 As noted by the South African Law Commission,107 the most common general complaint 
about the justice system in South Africa is that the cost of litigation is prohibitive and this 
prevents meaningful access to courts ─ even those who have access to the courts are often 
victims of delay.108 The Commission further notes that the incomprehensibility and adversarial 
nature of the process with a resulting lack of control leads to a sense of frustration and 
disempowerment as courts are often limited in their response to legal issues, with litigation 
creating winners and losers, and with winners who may end up feeling like losers due to the 
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many legal remedies that may be imposed.109 This underscores the great importance of having an 
alternative dispute resolution system for resolution of disputes in South Africa.   
 The labour sector attempts at setting pace of dispute resolution by making provision for 
the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) established under the 
Labour Relations Act with jurisdiction to resolve industrial disputes, a system which shall be 
discussed at a later stage in this chapter with a view to draw inspiration from the South African 
approach. 
 The importance of constitutional recognition of alternative dispute resolution methods, 
which is a proposal for possible future amendment of the South African Constitution, lies in the 
origin of constitutional conception which views the constitution as a social contract between the 
citizens of a state and the sovereign government.  
 The social contract theory is set up as the legitimate basis for modern day government. It 
is to the effect that at the early stages of life, man would live a life of solitude in which everyone 
was a sovereign over his own affairs,110 which meant that each human being has the right to 
enforce his/her own rights in a way he/she deems best. The situation gradually changed with an 
increase in population and the diminishing of resources, which eventually led to great insecurity 
where it was every man for himself, and life thus became nasty, brutish and short.111 There was 
thus need for a sovereign who would regulate the resources and also adjudicate and enforce the 
rights of the people who were governed.112 This led largely to the existence of modern day arms 
of government being the legislative arm, the executive arm and the judicial arm. 
 It is the judicial arm of government that is of particular interest to this discussion.   This 
is the arm that is tasked with dispute resolution and adjudication. An inference can be safely 
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drawn from the social contract theory, as summarised above, that dispute resolution was once 
one of the individual functions that were yielded to the sovereign to exercise on behalf of the 
people.113 This is mainly because dispute resolution almost always calls for the determination of 
the nature, scope and extent of rights, which as was noted in the earlier summary on the social 
contract theory, were submitted to the sovereign to enforce them on behalf of the people. 
 The South African Constitution seems to have adopted this approach of letting the 
sovereign  (in this case the state) take charge of dispute resolution, as evidenced by s165 of the 
South African Constitution,  which states that the judicial authority of the Republic is vested in 
the courts.114 This gives constitutional anchorage to the traditional role of courts as the proper 
arena for dispute resolution. The lack of direct reference to alternative dispute resolution 
methods in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 would make any alternative 
dispute resolution method, including methods for the resolution of industrial disputes, 
subservient to court processes. On the other hand, the constitutional promotion of alternative 
dispute resolution methods would give them more validity and respect by governmental 
institutions and officials, leading to an enhanced access to justice. 
 The next section of this chapter analyses the efficacy of alternative forms of dispute 
resolution as employed in the resolution of industrial disputes in South Africa. This, as earlier 
mentioned, is intended to help draw inspiration from the common challenges shared by the South 
African system and the Kenyan system of industrial dispute resolution. It is also intended to 
identify the possibility there being unique challenges, peculiar to the Republic of South Africa, 
and the South African approach to the resolution of such challenges. The South African system is 
here considered as being suitable for comparative purposes because of the similarities found in 
the South African legal system and its Kenyan counterpart with regard to the development and 
application of the common law in dispute adjudication and resolution.  
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 Regardless of the fact that South Africa has a more diverse socio-cultural heritage than 
Kenya,  and is economically more developed than Kenya, both are African countries with 
challenges that are peculiar to Africa,  hence their suitability for  comparison. 
 
(b) History of Industrial Dispute Resolution in South Africa 
A brief historical analysis is always important when any system is reviewed.  This is because for 
the most part, structures in use today, including the legal system, arose from historical events. 
Ferreira115 comments on the importance of reviewing history especially with regard to labour 
relations in South Africa as follows: 
Knowledge about history of a phenomenon can contribute to a greater understanding of the present by 
placing it in context and showing how it has evolved. This applies particularly to labour relations in South 
Africa. In the past labour relations was characterized by the domination of one group of workers over 
another group. The development of labour relations was mainly determined by the historical position of 
black workers.116 
This section thus seeks to state briefly the history of industrial dispute resolution in South 
Africa with a view to identifying the key events that brought about its current system of 
industrial dispute resolution. According to Ferreira,117 the history of labour relations in South 
Africa can be explained in terms of  three distinct periods; the first being from the seventeenth 
that between the  century and the late  twentieth century. This was characterized by agricultural 
activity until the discovery of diamonds and gold in 1867 and 1886 respectively.118 These 
discoveries brought about the industrial revolution, leading and the consequent development and 
formation of trade unions to which only trained workers were allowed to belong.119  It is worth 
noting that the first dispute resolution mechanism used took the form of industrial councils, 
structures established to resolve disputes after   the general strike of 1922 that was ended by the 
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use of force by the state. Socio-political developments in the country played a role in the 
establishment of dispute resolution mechanisms and labour relations procedures. Ferreira notes 
as follows: 
When the National Party came to power in 1948, greater emphasis was placed on the policy of separate 
development. There was no clear distinction between the political and the labour relations systems during 
this period. Legislation restricted trade union activities and strikes. The trade union movement became 
established as a permanent factor in the South African system of labour relations. By 1976 it became clear 
that the Black Labour Relations Act of 1973 had not solved the problem of black worker labour problems. 
South Africa's major trading partners, partly because of the 1976 riots, became aware of the labour position 
of the black worker (Bendy 2001, 74). In the wake of the tension in the labour sphere, the government 
appointed a Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation in 1977, commonly known as the Wiehahn 
Commission, to seek possible means of adapting the industrial relations system to changing needs by 
rationalizing the then existent labour legislation to eliminate bottlenecks and other problems experienced in 
the labour sphere.120 
As noted in the above excerpt, race was considered to be a factor in the formulation of 
labour systems. Thus one of the recommendations that was reached by the Wiehahn Commission 
was that race should cease to be a criterion for the recognition of trade unions by the 
government. According to Ferreira, this recommendation was accepted by the government as it 
encouraged the mobilization of black workers since they would no longer be classified and 
distinguished on the basis of their race.121 
The second period identified by Ferreira,122 is that of between 1988 and 1994 that was 
characterized by significant socio-political changes. These changes resulted in the amendment 
and expansion of labour legislation, of the establishment of forums for joint consultations, and 
the adoption of dispute resolution as part of labour relations.  
The final period, after 1995, saw the passing of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 that, as 
noted by Ferreira, was an attempt by the democratic government to achieve a balance of power 
between employee and employer and ensure the cooperation of all the parties involved in the 
labour process.123 According to Siphiwo,124 before the Labour Relations Act of 1995 came into 
force the dispute resolution system in South Africa was marred by problems especially with 
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regards to statutory procedures that which were complex and full of technicalities so that, instead 
of reducing the disputes, they created additional disputes and intensified industrial action.125 He 
refers to Backer & Oliver126who state that research has shown that the South African 
adjudication system of unfair dismissals was the most lengthy and expensive in the world and 
neither delivered meaningful results nor enjoyed the confidence of its users.127 He further notes 
that due to the ineffective statutory conciliation procedures which were also lengthy and 
complex, there often was an undesirable outcome in which the merits of a case could be lost on 
the basis of technicalities of procedure.128 
The next section of this work begins with a discussion on the dispute resolution 
procedures of for the resolution of industrial disputes in the Republic of South Africa, as 
provided for under the Labour Relations Act of 1995. 
(c)  Industrial Dispute Resolution Procedures under the Labour Relations Act 96 of 1995 
(LRA)  
As stated earlier in the discussion on the history of industrial dispute resolution, the Labour 
Relations Act 96 of 1995 was passed in order to create a forum in which all the parties to 
industrial relations procedures are able to relate, as well as to provide. It also provided a 
simplified and more flexible dispute resolution framework in the form of the Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA).  
 This was established in terms of the LRA as a specialized body tasked with the resolution 
of industrial disputes. The CCMA is an autonomous body129 with all juristic capabilities such as 
ability to have its own seal, and to purchase and hold property. It is independent of the state, 
political parties, trade unions, employers, or employers’ organisations.130 However, while the 
CCMA is said to be independent of the state, and not liable for any acts or omission done in good 
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faith,131 it is not excluded from the purview of the constitutional right to fair administrative 
action.132 The view held in this work is that this is a contradiction, in the sense that although the 
CCMA is a statutory body, it is still independent of the state.  
 Under Section 117 (2) of the LRA, the CCMA commissioners are appointed on a fixed-
term contract basis without any security of tenure and guarantee of reemployment.133 This is 
further expounded by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo v. Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
(2007).134 There it was stated that the CCMA is not a court of law a  commissioner is empowered 
to conduct the arbitration under s138 (1) in any manner he or she deems appropriate in order to 
determine the dispute fairly and quickly and with minimal formalities.135 The court linked the 
lack of security of tenure of CCMA commissioners with the question as to whether CCMA 
decisions can come under review within the ambit of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act (PAJA). It quoted Brassey136 who states that, unlike the Labour Court, the CCMA does not 
enjoy the same status as a court and thus does not exercise judicial authority within the context 
of the Constitution.137 
  S.115 of the LRA lists the functions of the CCMA as follows:  
(a)    Attempt to resolve, through conciliation, any dispute referred to it in terms of this 
Act; 
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(b)   If a dispute that has been referred to it remains unresolved after conciliation, 
arbitrate the dispute if- 
(i)    This Act requires arbitration and any party to the dispute has requested that the 
dispute be resolved through arbitration; or  
(ii)  All the parties to a dispute in respect of which the Labour Court has jurisdiction 
consent to arbitration under the auspices of the Commission;  
(c)    Assist in the establishment of workplace forums in the manner contemplated in 
Chapter V; and 
 (d)   Compile and publish information and statistics about its activities. 
(e) At least every second year, review the rules made under this section138 
It is noteworthy that the first dispute resolution mechanism and process that is applied by the 
CCMA is that of conciliation, which is similar to the Kenyan system. 139As was discussed in the 
first chapter to this work, there the minister upon reception of a statement of the dispute appoints 
a conciliator to attempt and resolve it by way of conciliation.140One difference between the 
Kenyan and South African situation is that, in Kenya the only alternative dispute resolution 
process that is recognized and given statutory backing in industrial dispute resolution is 
conciliation, in South Africa the LRA provides for arbitration as a mechanism.141 One advantage 
with having both conciliation and arbitration as mandatory industrial relation processes are 
applied is that both offer the parties greater opportunity to resolve their dispute without a 
necessary recourse to the mainstream judicial processes. 
Under s 115(2) of the LRA the CCMA has the discretion, if asked, to advise a party to the 
dispute as to the procedure to follow in terms of the Act,142 to assist a party to the dispute to 
obtain legal advice, assistance or representation,143 It may also provide administrative assistance 
to employees earning below the earning threshold as prescribed by the minister,144 as well as 
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offer to resolve a dispute that has not been referred to the Commission by conciliation.145 These 
provisions have set up the CCMA as a user-friendly body that is accessible to any member of the 
public. 
For the CCMA to be able to attempt resolution and adjudication of a dispute, the dispute 
must be properly classified as dispute that can be resolved by the proper exercise of CCMA 
jurisdiction. Under s 133 it provides the commission must appoint a commissioner to attempt 
resolution the dispute through conciliation: 
(a) Any dispute referred to it in terms of Section 134 
(b) Any other dispute referred to in terms of the Act146 
Section 134 relates to disputes on matters of mutual interest. In this case a party to such a 
dispute may refer the dispute to the commission in writing where the parties to the dispute are: 
(a) On the one side:- 
(i) One or more trade unions; 
(ii) One or more employees; or 
(iii) One or more trade unions and one or more employees 
(b) On the other side 
(i) One or more employers’ organization 
(ii) One or more employers; or 
(iii) One or more employers’ organization and one or more employers.147  
 From the foregoing, it is clear that in the South African labour relation system there is a 
clear distinction between disputes that are of right, that are disputes ‘in terms of the Act’,148and 
disputes that are of interest.149 Disputes of right are said to be disputes that occur when there is a 
violation of an actual entitlement or obligation as set out in contracts of employment, collective 
agreements, or in various pieces of legislation and regulations governing the employment 
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relation which come with the entitlement to strike.150Disputes of interest on the other hand, as 
noted by Ferreira, arise when a party to the employment relationship feels that he or she should 
be entitled to something but is not entitled to it.151 Ferreira further notes that should the 
entitlement be established after negotiation, the interest becomes a right.152 Commenting on the 
issue of benefits, which have been contentious as to whether they should be categorized as 
disputes of rights or of interests, the Labour Court, vide Marcus AJ in the case of Trans-Caledon 
Tunnel Authority vs. CCMA and others,153 stated as follows: 
It seems to me the need for preserving the distinction between “rights” and “interests” disputes, highlighted 
in Hospersa, in the CCMA’s assumption of jurisdiction to arbitrate ulp (sic) disputes relating to benefits, 
which distinction underlies the scheme of dispute resolution established by the LRA, would be adequately 
addressed by limiting the scope and application of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction relating to the 
provision of benefits, to those benefits for which the employee is entitled to apply to the employer in terms 
of his employment or under the existing employment structure or conditions, in the sense that the basis or 
potential for conferring the benefit already exists in the employment structure, whether in terms of his 
conditions of employment, existing policies or simply past practice of the employer in awarding the benefit 
in question as occurred in IMATU, where the basis of the employee’s claim for an acting allowance was 
that he had received the benefit on another occasion. In Hospersa on the other hand, where no present basis 
for granting an acting allowance was found to exist in terms of the employee’s conditions of service or the 
employer’s policy, procedure or practice, apart from the employee’s perception that a failure to pay such 
allowance was unfair, the court was justified in rejecting jurisdiction to arbitrate, in as much as the dispute 
was concerned with a matter of mutual interest which, as noted by Todd AJ, “the LRA clearly contemplates 
should be left to a process of bargaining between the parties”.154 
Thus from the above that the primary jurisdiction of the CCMA is to disputes of interest rather 
than disputes of rights, except where specifically provided for by the LRA. This limits the 
application of alternative dispute resolution methods to only interest-based disputes. Thus, as a 
proposal for reform, the alternative dispute resolution processes of conciliation and arbitration 
within the auspices of the CCMA could be extended to include rights-based disputes.  The South 
African system can be compared with Kenyan system, in contrast, whereby in the Kenyan 
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system, as discussed in the first chapter of this work, such a distinction in effect between disputes 
of right and of interest does not exist. 
Once a dispute has been referred to the CCMA, the appointed commissioner must attempt to 
resolve the dispute through conciliation within 30 days of receipt of the referral of the, even 
though the parties can agree to extend the 30-day period.155 This is similar to the Kenyan 
situation where the conciliator is also given 30 days to attempt a resolution of the dispute.156 The 
setting of definite timelines for resolution of industrial disputes is important in the sense that 
parties can predict when the process shall come to a conclusion.  
As elaborated in the second chapter of this work, industrial disputes generally have a far-
reaching effect on the economy and on the parties that are involved in the dispute, thus 
necessitating their speedy and effective resolution. A commissioner, in attempting the resolution 
of disputes may employ any of the following measures: 
(1)  Mediating the dispute 
(2) Conducting a fact-finding exercise; and 
(3) Making a recommendation to the parties which may be in the form of an advisory 
arbitration award.157 
When the conciliation has failed, or at the end of the 30-day period, the commissioner is 
mandated to issue a certificate stating whether or not the dispute has been resolved. The 
commission must serve a copy of the certificate to all the parties in the dispute, while the 
commissioner files the original certificate.158 This pattern is similar to that of Kenya, where the 
conciliator after 30 days also files a certificate stating whether or not the dispute has been 
resolved.159 
In instances when the LRA requires that a dispute be resolved by way of arbitration, the 
commission must appoint a commissioner to arbitrate after a commissioner has issued the 
abovementioned certificate to the effect that the dispute remains unresolved. Within 90 days of 
the issuance of the certificate, any party can request that the dispute be resolved through 
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arbitration.160Under s 136(2) the commissioner who performed the conciliation can be the same 
commissioner who performs the arbitration. However, a party may object to the arbitration being 
conducted by the same commissioner who performed the conciliation.161 The concept of the 
same commissioner performing both the conciliation and arbitration can be subject to debate, in 
the sense that the impartiality that is needed for arbitrators may be lacking or compromised in 
such a situation. 
Upon the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, the commissioner then proceeds to make 
a settlement award upon the agreement of the parties to the dispute or on application of either 
party to the dispute.162 An arbitral award marks the conclusion of the process, is final and 
binding, and enforced as if it were an order of the Labour Court.163 Arbitration awards, however, 
are subject to review under s 145 where a party alleges the existence of a defect in the arbitration 
proceedings. Such an application for review is made to the Labour Court within six weeks from 
the date on which the award was served upon the applicant. The defect must be either in relation 
to the commissioner committing a gross misconduct as to his or her duties as an arbitrator, 
committing gross irregularities in the conduct of the arbitration, or acting in excess of his or her 
powers.164 A review is also available where an award has been improperly obtained.165 
(d) Challenges associated with the South African Industrial Dispute Resolution System 
No system is perfect; every system suffers its own share of challenges. How a system responds 
to the challenges determines, to a great extent the success or failure of the system.  This section 
seeks to analyse the challenges that are experienced in the South African industrial dispute 
resolution system in a bid to identify the common challenges that may be shared between South 
Africa and Kenya and the problem- solving approaches that Kenya can learn from South Africa. 
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One of the challenges experienced in the South African industrial dispute resolution 
system is what is termed as that of flagrant disregard of the law by employers.166 This, as noted 
by Bendeman,167 is as a result of the considerable ignorance of the employers as to the applicable 
laws and procedures largely because the LRA was designed and drafted very legalistically.168 
This calls for a reform for future purposes in which such laws can be drafted in a simple format 
so as to enable lay people to interact with the law without facing any challenges as to 
interpretation. The employers’ ignorance of the law can be addressed by the creation of special 
forums where employers and employees alike can  be educated and an awareness created as to  
the dictates of the law with regard to employer and employee relationships, with a specific 
interest in dispute avoidance and resolution.  
Connected to the challenge of lack of awareness is the fact that employers lack   adequate 
procedures in the workplace for the resolution of disputes This increases the number of referrals 
of disputes to the CCMA. However, as Bendeman notes, the most important prerequisite for the 
handling of conflicts is the credibility of procedures.169 This applies directly to the case of 
employees who refer the disputes to the CCMA as they consider themselves disadvantaged due 
to the inequality in bargaining power. Thus the internal procedures for the resolution of the 
disputes must be considered to be fair and credible by all the parties, as this will reduce the 
occurrence of such referrals. This is a point of reform that can also be applied to the Kenyan 
legal system where organisations. Organizations and employers can be encouraged to develop 
credible and fair procedures that will enhance the prevention of disputes and their early 
resolution upon occurrence, without necessary referrals to the more formal and state-controlled 
systems of dispute resolution. 
Further, it is noted that the South African dispute resolution system is mostly designed 
largely for big employers.  This means it offers thus little flexibility to the small- and medium-
sized employers.170This thus leads to a situation where small employers are more willing and 
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ready to engage with employer organisations and even to take out insurance policies against 
CCMA awards. 171  Although Bendeman notes that one cannot change the system to suit small- 
and medium-sized employers, a system can be structurally adapted and designed in a way that it 
can be used in businesses of all sizes.. 
Accessibility to the CCMA, though considered as an advantage, can also be a 
disadvantage that leads to its being overburdened by disputes. This, as noted by Bendeman, 172is 
generally because of unfair dismissal practices. This is further compounded by the fact, that 
while the employer has the benefit of a legally trained industrial relations practitioner or 
consultant, the employee is not afforded legal representation. It would thus be worthwhile to 
introduce a reform which would enable the employee in a disciplinary hearing, even though a 
member of a union, to have access to legal counsel.173The CCMA code of good practice has 
come in to help bridge the gap to smaller employers. 
II. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has attempted a comparative analysis of the industrial dispute resolution 
system in South Africa, taking note of points of similarities. These include the fact that in both  it 
and the Kenyan system, the process begins with conciliation with specifically set timelines that 
must be observed, and  that. Further in both systems the conciliator issues a certificate at the end 
of the process. While most industrial disputes proceed to CCMA arbitration in South Africa, 
disputes in Kenya proceed to the Industrial Court. This is because Kenya lacks a statutory body 
such as the CCMA to specifically deal with industrial dispute resolution. It is thus recommended 
here   that the Kenyan industrial system be reformed so as to adopt a similar approach. The next 
chapter of this work comparatively analyses the Australian industrial dispute resolution system. 
This is because Australia is considered to have one of the most robust and progressive industrial 
dispute resolution systems in the world, especially with regard to alternative dispute resolution. It 
is hoped that this could be another instance when the reform of the Kenyan industrial dispute 
resolution system is inspired by developments that have taken place in foreign jurisdictions.   
                                                          







THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter entailed a comparative analysis of the South African industrial dispute 
resolution process. A distinction was noted between the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa and the Constitution of Kenya, in terms of making provision for alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  While the Kenyan Constitution makes express provision for the 
promotion of alternative dispute resolution,174 the South African Constitution makes an inference 
by implication, as noted in s 34,   that states that everyone has a right to have any dispute which 
can be resolved by the application of law, decided in a fair public hearing before a court, or, 
where appropriate, another impartial tribunal or forum. The ‘other impartial tribunal’ could 
possibly refer to an alternative dispute resolution process that does not necessarily involve or 
entail court intervention and action. 
It was also noted that the importance of constitutional recognition of such values in 
alternative dispute resolution lies in the fact that the constitution is regarded as an embodiment of 
the will of the people. This, as discussed in the previous chapter, derives from the social contract 
theory. This is to the effect that initially man lived in solitude and resources were plenty, but as. 
As the population increased these, greatly diminished to the extent that life became a competition 
and there was a need to install a sovereign who would manage resources and enforce individual 
persons’ rights.175 It was further noted that one of the functions and responsibilities under the 
social contract theory that was submitted and yielded to the sovereign was that of dispute 
adjudication and resolution.  This means that recognition of alternative dispute resolution 
methods by the constitution, would give such methods more validity and legitimacy as they 
would be reflective of the will of the people, rather than a merely a reflection of the will of the 
legislature...  
                                                          





Recognition of alternative dispute resolution methods by the constitution, would give the 
methods more validity and legitimacy as they would be reflective of the will of the people. This 
has more authority than mere legislative recognition which is considered to be a reflection of the 
will of the legislature. The history of industrial dispute resolution in South Africa was also 
discussed. It was noted that knowledge of the history of industrial dispute resolution is necessary 
if there is to be   an understanding of its current or future application. The first attempt to resolve 
industrial disputes was made during the period of South Africa’s industrial revolution with the 
establishment of industrial councils. Of critical importance was the fact that the developments in 
labour relations in South Africa took place concurrently with the socio-political developments in 
the country, especially as regards the black struggle for freedom from discrimination. The 
previous chapter categorised the history of labour relations in South Africa into three distinct 
periods. The first period was which, following the discovery of gold and diamonds in the 
nineteenth century and the rapid expansion and development of labour legislation from 1988 to 
1994,   culminated in the passing of 19th. The second was, the Labour Relations Act of 1995. 
The chapter proceeded to discuss the process of industrial dispute resolution under the 
Labour Relations Act in terms of which the CCMA was established as a primary dispute 
resolution body under the Labour Relations Act, the CCMA undertaking and performing its 
dispute resolution processes mainly by means of conciliation and arbitration. This is similar to 
the system operating in Kenya,   for in both countries it is the process of conciliation that is 
applied in the first instance, with. In both countries the conciliator performs similar duties with 
similar timelines, such as attempting to resolve a dispute within 30 days of its reference to 
conciliation.  Further having to issue a certificate to the effect that the dispute has remained 
unsolved even after the conciliatory process is similar to both countries.  
An important difference between the two is, however, that Kenya does not have a 
statutory arbitration process of resolving industrial disputes as South Africa, nor does it have a 
body like the CCMA to handle and process industrial disputes under the Labour Relations Act. It 
is for this reason that it is suggested that the Kenyan system be reformed   so that it can provide 
for a statutory body similar to the CCMA. 
In its conclusion the chapter briefly discussed the challenges faced by the South African 




employers, partly because most are ignorant of the requirements that the law imposes on them.  
The second is that the South African model seems as if it has been designed to meet the needs of 
big employers, and thus small- and medium-sized employers would rather resort to measures 
such as insuring themselves against CCMA awards, something that could be followed in Kenya, 
were the country to adopt the South African model. Before concluding this work and making a 
proposal for reform of the Kenyan system to adapt to the positives of the South African system, 
it is wise to consider Australia as another jurisdiction with industrial relations that can afford 
lessons for Kenyan regime.  
The comparison that follows will form the basis of the proposals for reform to be 
discussed in the last chapter of this work. This chapter adopts the format of the previous chapter 
by commencing with a brief historical overview of the development of the industrial and labour 
relations in Australia, with a bias towards the development of d a dispute resolution mechanism. 
The industrial dispute resolution procedures will then be discussed within the ambit of the 
Workplace Relations Act, (WRA)176 as well as the Fair Work Act (FWA).177 A discussion on the 
challenges faced by the Australian model of industrial dispute resolution will conclude as it seeks 
positive aspects that can be adopted into the Kenyan system 
(a)  Historical Development of Industrial Dispute Resolution in Australia 
The Australian industrial dispute resolution system generally draws its origins from the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904. This provided for the establishment of 
the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (CCCA). According to 
Hamilton,178around 1890,  during a period of drought and recession in colonial Australia  
extensive strikes took place  in the maritime, shearing and mining industries.179 The Royal 
Commission on Strikes, appointed earlier in an attempt to find a solution to the problem, 
experimented with the system of voluntary conciliation and arbitration. This failed, leading to the 
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promulgation of legislation for compulsory conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes.180 
The CCCA would try all means to resolve a dispute through conciliation and where it ended up 
unresolved after conciliation; the same body would administer arbitration of the dispute and 
issue an award.181 This seems similar to the South African system where the CCMA conducts 
both conciliation and arbitration with the processes at times running consecutively,  in the form 
of what is generally known in Australia as ‘Con-Arbs’.182 As noted by Hamilton, an award was 
defined as follows by one judge in 1819: 
‘…An award is a decree made by a judge or judges, deriving authority from the choice of the parties. The power of 
such Judge or Judges to decide, and the duty incumbent on the parties to obey the decision, arise solely from the 
contract of submission. In order therefore to support an action on an award, the contract of submission must be 
proved. The award itself is no evidence of contract, but when made in pursuance of a proper submission, then the 
parties may be said to have contracted to pay that, which  the arbitrators, so empowered, have by the award directed 
to pay.’183 
This definition of an award and its scope indicates that it applied to consensual arbitration 
that was non-coercive in nature and where the parties had agreed to submit the industrial dispute 
to resolution by way of arbitration. However, because this did not work out well for most types 
of disputes, legislation for compulsory conciliation in and arbitration of industrial disputes was 
enacted. Thus, arbitration of industrial disputes became a matter of law rather than merely one of 
contract. This was most evident after the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
defined an award to include an order,184 thus giving it greater force in law. 
  It is noteworthy, however , that the Australian conceptualization of an award was slightly 
different from that in other jurisdictions in the sense that awards were not merely adjudicative in 
nature, but were also declaratory of principles and the law and thus in a sense legislative in 
nature.185 For instance, minimum wage entitlements, penalty rates and allowances were 
developed early by awards, while entitlement to annual leave was developed in 1935 in the 
                                                          
180New South Wales, Royal Commission on Strikes, Report of the Royal Commission on Strikes appointed 25 
November 1890(1891,),, 25 as quoted by Hamilton. It is noteworthy that the compulsory conciliation and arbitration 
of industrial disputes was not performed by a private body but rather by a court. 
181Ibid. 
182 Section 136 (2) South African LRA 
183 Op cit note 177 
184 Section 4 of the Act. 




printing industry.186 This  shows that most of the labour entitlements enjoyed in Australia were 
developed from the large body of awards, which had clauses that were interpreted and applied 
,and  were meant to be a means of dispute prevention,  not only dispute resolution... The period 
between the year 1987 and 1995, as noted by Hamilton, saw the beginning of a process of the 
reformation of the award system, by consolidating previous awards and simplifying their use.187  
In conclusion, from a reading of the history of industrial dispute resolution process, the 
award system played a considerable role in the formulation of the current labour entitlements. 
The next section of this work briefly discusses the constitutional position of Australia with 
regard to alternative dispute resolution in civil disputes as well as industrial and labour relations 
disputes. 
(b) Australian Constitutional Position on Alternative Dispute Resolution 
As noted in the previous chapter, constitutional recognition and enshrinement of a particular 
ideal gives it more validity and enforceability as the constitution is an embodiment of the will of 
the people. The Constitution of Australia provides for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
of arbitration and conciliation to deal specifically with industrial disputes. Article 51 (xxxv) of 
the Australian Constitution 9th July 1900  gives Parliament the powers to make laws in respect of  
conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending 
beyond the limits of any one state.188 This provision in the Australian Constitution distinguishes 
it from the Kenyan and South African constitutions, in the sense that it provides specifically for 
the enactment of legislation that makes it possible for the alternative dispute resolution methods 
of conciliation and arbitration to be applied to industrial disputes. However, the industrial 
disputes   referred to by the constitution are those that ‘extend beyond the limits’ of any one 
state.189This is more so because Australia is a federal state and thus individual states have the 
power to make their own legislation for the application of such alternative dispute resolution 
methods within their territories.190 The next section analyses the industrial dispute resolution 
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procedure as set out in the Workplace Relations Act and the Fair Work Act,  both passed in 
accordance with the constitutional mandate discussed above. 
(c) Industrial Dispute Resolution under the Workplace Relations Act (Repealed) 
Australia’s Workplace Relations Act191 was among the acts important of the acts of Parliament 
that were applicable to industrial relations. The Act provided a detailed model system for 
industrial dispute resolution that may be applied in the various states that form part of the 
Commonwealth of Australia. This section analyses and an appraises the industrial dispute 
resolution process set out in the Act,  with a view to drawing  inspiration for proposals for the  
possible reform of the Kenyan system. 
The Act stated that the model dispute resolution process does not apply in any particular 
dispute unless it applies to the dispute by way of provision of the Act.192 Disputes that could be 
resolved by this procedure would thus have to be creatures of the statute as well as the processes 
being non-coercive. Furthermore, the application of the model dispute resolution process could 
be invoked if it was included in the terms of a workplace agreement or award.193 ,The Act listed 
types of dispute the process can relate to: 
(a) Disputes about entitlements under the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard (see section 175); and 
(b) Disputes about the terms of a workplace agreement, where the agreement itself includes the model dispute 
resolution process or is taken to include that process (see section 353); and 
(c) Disputes about the application of a workplace determination (see section 504); and 
(d) Disputes about the application of awards (see section 514); and 
(e) Disputes under Division 1 of Part 12, which deals with meal breaks (see section 609); and 
(f) Disputes under Division 2 of Part 12, which deals with public holidays (see section 614); and 
(g) Disputes under Division 6 of Part 12, which deals with parental leave (see section 691).194 
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The disputes categorised above could thus be dealt with by the type of process was set 
out in the model dispute resolution process. As may be noted, the above disputes were rights 
based having their origins either from workplace agreements, or awards. The use of the word 
‘including’ in the wording of the note to s 694 of the Workplace Relations Act implies non-
exclusivity, which meant that the above list of industrial disputes is not an exhaustive.195 Thus a 
jurisdiction like that of Kenya can adopt a similar process and include a broader range of 
disputes to be covered.196 
The preliminary recommendation in dispute resolution under the model process, was that 
the parties to the dispute genuinely attempt to resolve the dispute at workplace level, which, as 
noted, would involve an affected individual first discussing the matter in dispute with his or her 
supervisor and then with senior management. This is in line with the I.L.O. Labour Disputes 
System guidelines, as discussed above. It was also noted in the second chapter that resolution of 
disputes should be primarily through the efforts of the disputing parties themselves.197 This flows 
from the general principle in dispute resolution which is to the effect that it is the parties 
themselves who know the nature of their interests in the dispute and thus are able to formulate 
their solutions. Such a provision for resolution of the dispute via internal is healthy,  as it creates 
a forum for  the preservation of the continued relationship between the parties,  which would 
otherwise have deteriorated  in necessitating the intervention of a third party. 
In circumstances where the dispute still remains unresolved at the workplace level, the 
Act provided that a party may resolve or elect to use an alternative dispute resolution process 
conducted by a person that has been previously agreed, on,.198If the parties failed to agree on 
who is to conduct the alternative dispute resolution process, either party would notify the 
Industrial Registrar,199who upon notification was obligated to give the parties the prescribed 
information.200It is noteworthy that the Act at this stage did not state what the prescribed 
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information is. The Industrial Registrar‘s dispute resolution powers seems to be limited to the 
giving of information in addition to registration functions. This is in contrast to the position in 
Kenya, where the minister has the power to appoint conciliators. 201 
The WRA also provided that alternative dispute resolution processes could also be 
conducted by the Australian Fair Pay Commission in situation where the parties have failed to 
agree on who should conduct the process.202 The WRA further provided that where such a 
process had been instituted, the parties would need to genuinely try to resolve the dispute by use 
of that process.203 This provision, by extension, provided a goodfaith approach by both parties to 
resolve the dispute. This approach, as was noted in the second chapter, is part of the I.L.O. 
Labour Dispute Systems Guidelines. The Act also preserved the status quo of the parties to the 
dispute resolution process by stating that an employee who is a party to the dispute must 
continue to work in accordance with the terms of the contract,204as well as comply with any 
reasonable direction given by  his or her employer.205This had the effect of preempting any  case 
of employee victimization  during the process.206 
The following are the alternative dispute resolution processes that were set out under the 
repealed Act and the model procedure: 
(a) Conferencing; and 
(b) Mediation; and 
(c) Assisted negotiation; and 
(d) Neutral evaluation; and 
(e) Case appraisal; and 
(f) Conciliation; and 
(g) Arbitration, or other determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in dispute; and 
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(h) A procedure or service specified in the regulations.207 
As noted above, the Act distinguished and listed conciliation as a different process from 
mediation, which is generally in line with the I.L.O Legislation Guidelines. These guidelines, as 
noted earlier, distinguish the two processes of mediation and conciliation.208The main distinction 
between the process of mediation and conciliation set out in the guidelines relates to the role of 
the third party intervener. While both processes are similar in terms of outcome and general 
process, according to the guidelines, in mediation the third party has a more active role and a 
greater mandate and authority than in the conciliation process.209Kenya, however, does not 
distinguish between the two. 
The parties commenced the process by making an application to the Commission in the 
prescribed format, describing in detail the matters in dispute that the parties need to apply the 
alternative dispute resolution methods to, as well as specifying the kind of procedure they wish 
to be followed.210 At this point the parties had a choice as to which of the processes on the list 
mentioned above they would wish to pursue.  As was noted in the discussion of the guidelines in 
the second chapter of this work,211 this autonomy enables whatever outcome of the process to be 
completely binding on the parties, as the parties have voluntarily chosen the method of resolution 
of the dispute. This is in line with the I.L.O. Recommendation Number 92 on Voluntary 
Conciliation and Mediation of disputes. 
(i) Powers of the Commission212 
If the Commission agreed to undertake any alternative dispute resolution process selected 
by the parties, it would be required to take any action that is deemed appropriate for the 
resolution and settlement of the dispute.213This included arranging conferences of the parties or 
their representatives at which the Commission is present; and arranging for the parties or their 
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representatives to confer among themselves at conferences at which the Commission is not 
present.214 The arrangement for a time for the representatives of the parties to meet in the 
absence of the Commission is akin to assisted negotiation. The usefulness of the meeting is 
debatable, especially in circumstances where the parties have previously had bilateral meetings 
and workplace forums where settlement was reached. The commission is required to act quickly 
and in a way that avoids unnecessary technicalities and legal forms. Further, if the parties have 
agreed that an aspect of the process is to be conducted in a particular way the commission is 
bound to respect the agreement of the parties in dispute.215 The expediency requirement is 
inherent in any process that is alternative to litigation in court. As was discussed in the second 
chapter, above, industrial disputes have far-reaching consequences well beyond the individual 
disputants themselves. For instance, the economy of a country can suffer losses during a 
protracted strike, thus it is more important that industrial disputes are resolved than are others 
which may be more private in nature. 
Regardless of the above powers and functions of the commission, the WRA indicates that the 
Commission lacks the power :  
(a) To compel a person to do anything; or 
(b) To arbitrate the matter, or matters, in dispute; or 
(c) To otherwise determine the rights or obligations of a party to the dispute; or 
(d) To make an award in relation to the matter, or matters, in dispute; or 
(e) To make an order in relation to the matter, or matters, in dispute; or 
(f) To appoint a board of reference..216 
This limitation of the powers of the commission appears to contradict the dispute resolution 
processes set out in s 698, which included arbitration and the determination of rights.217 This 
should be noted if the Australian model is adopted in some aspects in Kenya.  It is, in fact, South 
African CCMA’s quasi-authoritative role that would serve as the best example to be followed by 
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Kenya .The Commission is mandated to conduct private sessions during the dispute resolution 
process.218  It must, however, not disclose or use any document given to the Commission in the 
course of this process unless the information or document is disclosed or used for the purpose of 
conducting the process; or the parties to the process consent to the disclosure or use; or the 
information or document is disclosed or used in circumstances specified in Regulations made or 
the disclosure or use is otherwise required or authorized by law.219 
All the information that is shared during the proceedings is entirely inadmissible in court. 
The Act states that evidence of anything said, or any act done, in the alternative dispute 
resolution process is not admissible in proceedings relating to the dispute: in any court or before 
a person authorized by a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory to hear evidence; or 
before a person authorized by the consent of the parties to hear evidence unless the parties agree 
to the evidence being admissible; or the evidence is admitted in circumstances specified in 
Regulations.220 The provision for inadmissibility of the evidence or material disclosed in the 
interactions and negotiations within the ambit of the Commission plays a role to ensure that 
bargaining is done without any perceived inhibition in any way. The process of dispute 
resolution is considered to be completed when the issues in the dispute are resolved or the party, 
who elected to use the Commission as a dispute resolver, informs the Commission that it no 
longer wishes to continue with the process. 
It is worth noting that the extent of court intervention in the process under the Model Law 
was limited to appeals as contemplated by Section 120 of the repealed Workplace Relations Act 
which provided for appeals against an order of the Australian Industrial Relation Commission. 
Further, the Commission itself could make a reference to the court on matters of law. This 
minimal interference by the court in matters governed by the Model law is part of the reason why 
the Model law is endearing. 
This is the process that is set out in the model procedure for industrial dispute resolution. 
In the final chapter of this work, various proposals for reform will be discussed, and analysed for 
adoption and incorporation into the Kenyan system. The next section critiques the model 
                                                          
218 Section 702(1). 
219 Section 702 (2). 




procedure before the last section of this chapter discusses the dispute resolution process under 
the Fair Work Act. 
(ii) Appraisal of the Model Dispute Resolution Procedure  
As noted in the above discussion, the Workplace Relations Act provided for a model procedure 
for the resolution of industrial disputes. In this   section the model procedure is critiqued in order 
to establish whether it is able    to serve as a model for an appropriate dispute resolution process 
for the resolution of industrial disputes in Kenya. 
The first challenge raised by the procedure, as noted by B Wolski, 221 relates to 
uncertainty regarding its scope.. This is because the Act stated that the model procedure would 
cover any matter that may be in dispute between the parties to a workplace agreement.222 This, as 
noted by Wolski, is essentially a rights-based approach to the resolution of the dispute since the 
disputes would deal with matters incidental to and related to existing rights provided for under 
the workplace agreement. This would be in contrast to the provision for an application of the 
model procedure to extend to interest disputes that occur in the context of the negotiation for and 
varying of workplace agreements. This concurs with the finding made by MacDermott& and  
Riley, 223 who note that the model dispute resolution process , which attempted  to push potential 
litigants to the  ADR,  applied  significantly to complaints concerning breaches of the Act and 
other basic rights and entitlements.224The above authors note that the laws were repealed before 
their impact could fully be ascertained. Further, as noted by Wolski, the   lack of definition of a 
dispute by in model procedure may lead to a situation in which parties may contest the existence 
of a dispute in the context of the Act.225 Thus if the model procedure were to be applied in 
Kenya, there would be need to extend it to cover both interest-based and just-rights 
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disputes.226This is because both types of disputes have far reaching implications, as noted earlier, 
that go beyond individual disputants. 
Another challenge that is noted by Wolski relates to the fact that there was limited access to the 
system for the employee who could only access it through the employee supervisor.227 This is 
especially because s 695 of the Act provides that the employee would need to first discuss the 
matter in contention with the supervisor before accessing the system. This is meant to promote 
the genuine efforts of the parties to resolve the dispute as much as possible. The only limit to this 
is the fact that the supervisor, as noted by Wolski, might generally be part of the problem in 
question and hence the employee may feel intimidated.228 
Wolski comments that the model procedure as provided for in the Workplace Relations 
Act fell short of providing an elaborate mechanism for the prevention of disputes:  there was no 
obligation on the part of employers to establish notification and consultation procedures that may 
be used to ensure that the dispute is adequately prevented and managed at the pre-dispute 
level.229 She further notes that the general lack of procedural certainty and acts as a stumbling 
block to some procedures that are mentioned in the model procedure such as mediation and 
negotiation. She notes as follows: 
‘Without the aid of a definition and a set of procedural rules, the extent of mediator authority is uncertain. It 
seems clear that mediators do not have power to make binding determinations and they generally lack 
power to give directions and to make orders. They may make certain requests of the parties, for example, 
they may request that the parties provide documents relevant to the dispute or that parties exchange such 
information as is required to allow a fruitful exploration of disputed issues and possible options for 
resolution. Since the model clause provides that the parties agree to participate in mediation in good faith, 
they may be obliged to comply with all reasonable requests made by the mediator. Unfortunately, what 
constitutes a reasonable request and the exact parameters of what is required by ‘good faith’ participation 
are not entirely clear. To some extent, the question may be a moot one for mediators cannot take default 
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measures against a party who fails to comply with a request124 and they are unable to call upon the 
Commission for support and assistance.230’ 
 The challenges faced by the model law   were such   that it was repealed together with the 
Workplace Relations Act. However, this research proposes that Kenya should adopt an amended 
version of the model contained in the Workplace Relations Act. These amendments are 
necessary if the challenges discussed are addressed. 231 The Australian legislature replaced the 
Workplace Relations Act with the 2009 Fair Work Act, discussed below. 
(d) Industrial Dispute Resolution under the Fair Work Act  
The Fair Work Act provides a more standard format and procedure for the settlement of 
industrial disputes of differing nature, such as unlawful dismissal, termination of employment, 
collective agreements and industrial actions. This section summarises the dispute resolution 
procedure for the settlement of termination of employment disputes. Under s 773 of the Act, if an 
employer has terminated an employee’s employment, and the employee, or an industrial 
association that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the employee, alleges that the 
employee’s employment was terminated in contravention of s 772(1); the employee, or the 
industrial association may apply to the Fair Work Authority (FWA) for the FWA to deal with the 
dispute.232 An application is to be made within 60 days after the employment was terminated or 
within such further period as the FWA allows.233 The FWA may extend the period for the filing 
of the complaint in exceptional circumstances, taking the following into account: 
(a) The reason for the delay; and 
(b) Any action taken by the employee to dispute the termination; and 
(c) Prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and 
(d) The merits of the application; and 
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(e) Fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position.234 
After the dispute has been properly refereed, the FWA conducts a conference, 235 issues a 
certificate if the dispute is not resolved.236The FWA then advises the parties on whether they 
should go to court or not.237 It is worth noting that the FWA plays a minimal role in ensuring that 
the dispute is resolved. The Act does not mention that the FWA has a mandate to apply 
alternative dispute resolution processes in order to resolve industrial disputes. The nature of the 
conferences and hearings is also not specified. 
(i)  Appraisal of the Dispute Resolution Regime under the Fair Work Act 
As noted in the previous section, the dispute resolution process in the Fair Work Act is not as 
elaborate as that set out in the model procedure in terms of the repealed Workplace Relations 
Act. This is because the procedure is similar under the various headings of causes of action in the 
Act. This is in contrast to a legislative system that proposes a uniform system for dispute 
resolution that would apply to all the causes of action under the Act. However, for purposes of 
this section, the appraisal shall relate specifically to the resolution of disputes regarding unfair 
dismissal under the Australian Fair Work Act. 
According to MacDermott& and  Riley, 238 the process set out in the Fair Work Act can 
be distinguished from that in the repealed Workplace Relations Act , in the sense that the 2009 
Act does not actively encourage parties to engage the services of private ADR providers, though 
it does provide for more informal processes towards the resolution of disputes. They further note 
that the dispute resolution procedures under the Fair Work Act (FWA) are only mandatory if it is 
alleged that there has been a dismissal in contravention of the general protection provisions of 
the Act. Further, if a person has not been dismissed but still alleges that there has been some 
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contravention of the general protection provisions of the Act, then the dispute resolution 
processes would be dependent on the concurrence of all the parties to the dispute.239  
Making the processes voluntary and dependent on the concurrence and agreement of the 
other parties to the dispute serves as both as an advantage and a disadvantage, as was noted in 
the preceding chapters of this work. In summary, a dispute resolution process that has been 
administered with the parties’ free volition ensures a higher chance of their engaging in good 
faith and reduces the likelihood of litigation after the alternative dispute resolution processes 
have been exhausted. Alternatively, if the processes are voluntary this could result in the parties 
completely ignoring them and moving directly to litigation too.240 
Quoting Meredith, 241 MacDermott and Riley242 note that his study found that the use of 
conciliation in unfair dismissal applications was almost guaranteed as it satisfied the dispute 
resolution criteria as to accessibility, timeliness, cost effectiveness and fairness. However while. 
Further, finality, particularly  this was seemingly due to the fact that the costs associated with 
proceeding beyond conciliation were prohibitive  –,  was a major factor that influenced the 
employees’ attitude towards settlement of the disputes. This finding further justifies an extension 
of the mandatory nature of the dispute resolution processes, one that will include other disputes 
and causes of action and go beyond just the dispute resolution of unfair dismissal disputes. This 
could have the same ripple effect on all the other kinds of disputes that are governed by the Act. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed the Australian industrial dispute resolution system framework and 
traced it from its historical roots to the system .operating presently. It was noted that, unlike the 
South African system, the Australian system makes provision for a model procedure for the 
resolution of such disputes. In the final chapter of this work, various proposals for the reform of 
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the Kenyan system will be analysed while bearing in mind arguments and recommendations 























CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 As was noted in the first chapter, an efficient and functional industrial dispute resolution 
framework is important for the well ordering and growth of industry. There has been a general 
shift to service-based industries and this has led to the growth and development of the labour 
sector and, by extension, the development of industrial dispute resolution systems.  An increase 
in the occurrence of industrial disputes has meant that courts are overwhelmed with a backlog of 
cases, which has the effect of frustrating litigants, resulting in delays and considerable expense. 
This   led to calls for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for the resolution of industrial 
disputes. 
The first chapter noted that the Kenyan Constitution, while providing for access to justice 
for all persons, made an independent provision for alternative dispute resolution in art  article 
159(2) (c). These procedures are listed in the article and include reconciliation, mediation, 
arbitration and traditional dispute resolution methods. This was followed by a discussion on the 
various forms of alternative dispute resolution, commencing with arbitration, a procedure that 
was always conducted under the cloud of litigation and court intervention, thereby defeating its 
very purpose as an alternative to court litigation.  
Also discussed was the mediation process. It was recognized  that,  while it has various 
advantages in dispute resolution, ,mediation is not necessarily effective in situations in which 
there  is  a power imbalance between the parties, as is often the case in industrial disputes 
between employer and employee and  is  something that would need to be addressed.   
It was further noted that In the Kenyan industrial dispute resolution system it is 
conciliation, a process similar to mediation,   that is the favoured method of the resolution of 
disputes.  Conciliation is provided for in the Kenyan Labour Relations Act: the minister is 
required to appoint a conciliator who attempts a conciliation to resolve the dispute. This 
conciliation process thus can, if necessary,   be adjusted according to ensure that any actual or 
perceived power imbalance is addressed. The court in Kenya plays a major role, in the 
enforcement, review of, and appeal against arbitral awards, all of which defeat the purpose of 




chapter stressed that it was essential that a labour dispute resolution, procedure was efficient, as a 
reduction in cost and time would mitigate any negative impact that a labour dispute could have 
on the economy and other persons who are not party to the dispute.243  This need for efficiency is 
sufficient justification for a recommendation for the development of a comprehensive alternative 
dispute resolution system for industrial dispute resolution that is self-sufficient in nature, without 
the need for judicial recourse. 
The second chapter also discussed the global framework for industrial dispute resolution. 
It commenced with a discussion on balancing the finality expectation with the right of review of 
an industrial arbitration award. It was also pointed out that arbitration, as an alternative dispute 
resolution process, is intended to offer a forum for the expeditious resolution of industrial 
disputes, because their very nature of requires an expeditious resolution. This is because 
industrial disputes have far-reaching consequences to the society as they interrupt the smooth 
and orderly development of the economy and the maintenance of law and order. Further, it to the 
advantage of anyone involved in any dispute, whether labour or private in nature, that the dispute 
is resolved expeditiously.  .  
The Constitution of Kenya recognizes social justice as one of the core values of the State,244 and 
thus individual social justice requirements, and economic requirements are catered for by the 
expeditious resolution of disputes.  There is thus a need, as was noted, for the development of a 
dispute resolution system that will not only expedite the resolution of such industrial disputes, 
but will also provide both procedural and substantive fairness.  
As was further noted, arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution process is intended 
to be final and conclusive, and exclusive of the court process, especially in situations where the 
parties have entered into an agreement that clearly stipulates the finality of arbitration. However, 
establishment of any arbitration process entirely immune from review would cause an injustice 
to the victims of an arbitration process that was flawed. It is for this reason that the second 
chapter analysed three different approaches that could be used to strike a balance between 
fairness and finality. The first was to restrict review to procedural irregularities; the second to 
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restrict it to questions of law,; and the third suggested arbitral award reviewed by another arbitral 
tribunal independent of the supervision and control of the judiciary. This 
The chapter also discussed the I.L.O.’s framework for the promotion of alternative 
dispute resolution. It was noted that in promoting social justice, the I.L.O. was also indirectly 
promoting the best dispute resolution, one that would ensure the realisation of social justice, as 
most conflicts and disputes originate from perceived injustice. The chapter also analysed of the 
I.L.O. Labour Dispute System Guidelines for improved performance, their purpose being to help 
individual states to come up with a more effective dispute resolution framework. The Guidelines 
acknowledged the inevitability of conflict due to the power imbalance inherent in an 
employment relationship.245 To this end, it was noted that the Guidelines put forth a 
recommendation that an effective dispute resolution mechanism should, in the first instance, be 
aimed at preventing disputes.  
Another key recommendation in the guidelines was that the peaceful resolution of 
industrial disputes should be primarily through the efforts of the disputing parties themselves. 
This would thus be giving effect to the non-coercive forms of alternative dispute resolution that 
would focus on the primary disputants themselves. A discussion of   the  I.L.O. Recommendation 
Number92 on Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration concluded  the second chapter, ,taking note 
that in promoting  the voluntary means of dispute resolution not only ensures that parties are able 
to engage with each other in good faith, but also assists with preventing disputes from arising. 
This is in direct contrast to the Kenyan framework that provides for compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration where there an agreement to arbitrate is in force. 
The third chapter entails a comparative analysis of the South African industrial dispute 
resolution process. It was noted that there are differences between the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa and the Constitution of Kenya, as regards the provision for alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  While the Kenyan Constitution makes express provision for 
alternative dispute resolution,246 the South African Constitution only does so by implication in its 
s 34. This section states that everyone has a right to have any dispute, which can be resolved by 
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the application of law, decided in a fair public hearing before a court, or where appropriate, 
another impartial tribunal or forum. The other ‘impartial tribunal’ referred to includes alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms that do not necessarily involve or entail court intervention and 
action. 
It was also noted that the importance of constitutional recognition of such values in alternative 
dispute resolution lies in the fact that the constitution is regarded as an embodiment of the will of 
the people. This, as was discussed in the previous chapter, is based on social contract theory that 
posits that initially man lived in solitude with access to plentiful resources. As the population 
increased, these resources were greatly diminished, to the extent that life became a competition. 
There arose a need to install a sovereign who would manage resources and enforce the rights of 
an individual.247 It was further noted that under this theory,   one of the functions and 
responsibilities submitted and yielded to the sovereign was that of dispute adjudication and 
resolution.  .Recognition of alternative dispute resolution methods by the constitution would 
similarly therefore give them more validity and legitimacy, as they would be reflective of the 
will of the people, rather than merely that of the legislature. 
The history of industrial dispute resolution in South Africa was discussed in the third 
chapter. It was noted that in order to understand the concept of industrial dispute resolution, it is 
essential that its historical context is also understood. It is important, too, that the current 
application of the concept is understood if new ideas are to be formulated in the future. Industries 
were first regulated in South Africa during its   industrial revolution in the form of industrial 
councils, established to resolve industrial disputes that would arise. Of critical importance was 
the fact that the South African labour relations movement developed contemporaneously with the 
political developments in the country, -especially the black struggle for freedom and democracy. 
The chapter discussed the process of industrial dispute resolution under the South African 
Labour Relations Act and noted that the CCMA was established as a primary dispute resolution 
body under the Labour Relations Act; it undertakes and performs its dispute resolution processes 
largely through conciliation and arbitration. The South African system is similar to that of Kenya 
as conciliation is the first process that it applied. The conciliator performs similar duties with 
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similar timelines  ─ such as attempting a resolution of the dispute within 30 days of reference to 
conciliation and the issuance of a certificate to the effect that the dispute has remained 
unresolved, even after the conciliatory process.  
A marked contrast was, however, noted between the two jurisdictions, for Kenya does not have a 
statutory arbitration process as a means for the resolution of industrial disputes as is the case in 
South Africa; neither does it have a body like the CCMA to handle and process industrial 
disputes. It was suggested that the Kenyan system should be reformed to provide for a statutory 
body similar to South Africa’s CCMA. The chapter ended with a brief discussion on the 
challenges presented by the South African model of industrial dispute resolution.  
The first of these challenges to be acknowledged   was that of the employers’ flagrant disregard 
of the law, partly due to their ignorance of the requirements that the law imposes on them.   
Another problem is that the Labour Relations Act and the dispute resolution model under it 
largely address the needs of big employers. This is not to say that it does not address the needs of 
small-sized employers at all, 248 but it appears that the model is inadequate for their needs. This 
means that small-and medium-sized employers therefore have challenges with it, which they 
would rather address via extraneous measures.249 Such challenges would be shared with Kenya, 
if Kenya were to adopt the South African model .in its entirety.  
The fourth chapter of this work comprised a comparative analysis of the Australian 
industrial dispute resolution system. It was noted that the concept of industrial awards within the 
Australian jurisdiction entailed a slightly different meaning from the contemporary knowledge of 
the meaning and scope of awards, in the sense that Australian awards are considered 
pronouncements of industrial rights rather than mere adjudications. It was further noted that the 
Australian Constitution, while not providing for alternative dispute resolution measures directly, 
distinguishes itself from the Kenyan and South African Constitutions by providing for the 
development of legislation that would give effect to alternative dispute resolution.  
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The Fair Work Act and the repealed Workplace Relations Act were also discussed, and 
the system provided for in the model dispute resolution procedure under the Workplace 
Relations Act preferred because of its promotion of the disputants’ role in the dispute resolution 
processes as well as its expediency requirements. However, even that would have to be amended 
before its adoption in Kenya if it were to   adequately cater for challenges as regards the 
uncertainty as to the scope of the system, its limitation of access by employees, as well as its 
provision for dispute prevention methods. 
The next section discusses a few principles of industrial systems design that can be considered in 
the redesigning of the Kenyan industrial dispute resolution framework. These principles act as 
guidelines rather than rules. 
(a) Principles for Industrial Dispute Systems Design 
In view of the findings summarized above, there is a clear need for developing and designing a 
working dispute system for the Kenyan labour relations sector. Such a system would take in the 
above recommendations into consideration.  This include the  establishment  of a body  to handle 
labour disputes,  like the South Africa’s  CCMA and  providing a system that would be as 
conclusive as possible. Thus, such a system should conform to the best practices in the industry 
and the principles of industrial systems design that are discussed in this section. 
Wolski250 identifies a few principles for industrial dispute systems design, principles 
which this work proposes should be adopted in the design of an effective dispute resolution 
system in the context of the Kenyan industrial relation system. The first principle is the definition 
of the scope of the system, which was one of the challenges noted in the application of the model 
dispute resolution procedure. She opines that the scope of what amounts to a dispute within the 
context of the system ought to be accurately defined so that the parties to a dispute are able to 
understand what can and cannot be referred to it. She further states that the criteria for the 
selection of cases needs to be identified and publicised and the relationship of these to external 
avenues of redress clearly elaborated.251 
                                                          





Related to the above, is the need for the establishment of easily accessible systems of 
dispute resolution.  In terms of the principle of accessibility, South Africa’s CCMA that  is 
devoid of numerous technicalities of procedure and is accessible more so to employees, can be 
considered an ideal worthy of emulation.. The accessibility of such a system does not, however, 
come without challenges of its own, one of these being that it can be overwhelmed by disputants 
seeking relief, thereby reducing its efficacy and replicating the position of the law courts, for 
these  are similarly overwhelmed.  
  Emphasis should be given to the prevention of disputes rather than their resolution. Such 
prevention would greatly reduce the burden of resolving disputes that have already arisen as well 
as the costs involved in dispute resolution.  In this regard Wolski observes as follows: 
‘Procedures aimed at prevention of disputes may be incorporated at both the pre-dispute and post-dispute 
levels of a dispute resolution system. Notification and consultation procedures, informal counselling, and 
informal third party intervention in the form of shuttle diplomacy might be used at the pre-dispute level, 
before differences escalate into disputes. At the post-dispute stage, it is advisable to incorporate procedures 
for systematically recording and analyzing complaint and dispute data. The data can be used to identify and 
rectify systemic and recurring problems and to prevent future disputes.’252 
The adoption of such procedures before and after the dispute will have the overall effect of 
reducing the occurrence of disputes as well as promoting dialogue and consensus in instances 
where the dispute has already occurred. Such procedures, as she notes, should give preference to 
interest-based processes of dispute resolution, such as mediation and conciliation, over rights-
based processes like arbitration and litigation. Wolski identifies a good dispute resolution system 
as one that incorporates procedures whereby persons who are already engaged in rights-based 
processes such as litigation and arbitration can revert to interest-based procedures. This process 
is identified by Wolski as a loop-back procedure.253 Apart from that, there should be in existence 
procedures that would ensure that disputes that are uniquely rights-based are  dealt with  via the 
rights-based alternative processes of arbitration and adjudication rather than costly litigation. 






Further, as discussed in the preceding chapters of this work, such rights-based approaches should 
be conclusive.254 For instance, instead of the parties   needing to appeal or seek higher review of 
arbitral awards, procedures could be set in place for their review by other arbitral panels rather 
than by courts of law. This kind of procedure can be provided for by law, or by agreement 
between the parties involved. 
II. CONCLUSION 
This work has discussed the industrial dispute resolution system in Kenya and made proposals 
drawn from the experiences of the South African and Australian jurisdictions. As dispute 
resolution is an area of law that develops  as societies become more complex, it is hoped that 
Kenya will find ways to incorporate best practices into the delicate arena of its industrial dispute 
resolution procedures. . More research should continuously be undertaken  on the development 
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